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REPORT SUMMARY 
In April 1979 the Legislative Audit Council was requested by 99 
members of the South Carolina General Assembly to conduct a comprehen-
sive review of the State's capabilities to respond effectively to nuclear 
emergencies. The request asked for a summary of the types of potential 
nuclear related hazards and the State's response capabilities for each, a 
review of the types and number of nuclear related accidents or incidents 
that have occurred in the State and how they were handled, and an 
evaluation of the adequacy of our current nuclear response capabilities. 
The Audit Council coordinated efforts with the Governor's Task 
Force for Emergency Response Capabilities in Support of Fixed Nuclear 
Facilities and the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. Both are 
studying nuclear emergency preparedness in South Carolina. This 
avoided unnecessary duplication and enhances the General Assembly's 
ability to provide direction to improve nuclear emergency preparedness 
in South Carolina. 
The Council staff reviewed State and Federal laws, rules and 
regulations, professional literature relating to nuclear energy oversight, 
control, licensing, inspections and emergency preparedness. The 
activities of State agencies with designated responsibilities in nuclear 
energy and emergency preparedness were examined to assess compliance 
with applicable laws, rules and regulations. The records of State 
agencies with designated roles in nuclear emergency response were 
examined to inventory the types, number and level of hazard associated 
with radiological accidents or incidents and to review the responses to 
incidents that have occurred. 
i 
The Audit Council's review revealed a number of deficiencies in 
the overall state of emergency preparedness for a nuclear accident or 
incident in South Carolina. These deficiencies taken cumulatively can 
severely undermine the ability of Federal, State and local officials to 
protect public health and safety by responding to a nuclear emergency 
in an efficient and effective manner. These deficiencies and related 
problems are summarized below. 
Inadequacies in State and Local Level Preparedness in the Event of a 
Major Accident at a Fixed Nuclear Facility in South Carolina 
Because of the number of problems observed after approximately 
six months of fieldwork, the Governor's Task Force for Emergency 
Response Capabilities in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities expanded 
the scope of its work. The new scope included a statewide assessment 
of nuclear emergency preparedness and the development of new policies 
and procedures for corrective action at the State and local level. 
The Audit Council observed the work of the Task Force and con-
curred with their findings and the corrective measures that are being 
recommended and those that are being implemented. In addition, testi-
mony before the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy by public officials 
and nuclear industry representatives from across the State, indicated 
that the problems revealed in initial investigations existed statewide. 
These problems and additional findings developed by the Audit Council 
staff are summarized in the following pages. 
(1) Although a Memorandum of Understanding for notification of unusual 
occurrences at nuclear plants exist between the nuclear facilities 
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and the Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) at the Department of 
Health and Environmental Control, the facilities are not required to 
notify the BRH of all unusual occurrences which involve radio-
active materials. Without prompt notification of all non-routine 
occurrences, the ability of the emergency response agencies to 
effectively advise on proper actions to be taken is eroded. (see 
p. 10) 
The Governor's Task Force found that no warning systems for 
notification of an emergency exist in the counties evaluated and 
plans and procedures for carrying out an evacuation are uncoordi-
nated and vague. Similar problems were indicated in testimony at 
hearings held by the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. The 
absence of public warning systems and lack of detailed plans for 
warning and evacuation would cause delay, inefficiency and confu-
sian if evacuation were necessary. (see p. 14) 
(3) There has been limited formal planning for coordination of evacuation 
among municipal, county and State law enforcement agencies. This 
lack of coordination could cause delay in evacuation and unnecessarily 
prolong public exposure to a hazard if evacuation were necessary. 
(see p. 16) 
( 4) A frequently found deficiency was the lack of detailed operational 
plans for emergency transportation and welfare services . Uncoordi-
nated efforts to transport citizens away from potential hazards 
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could cause delay when evacuation is necessary and unnecessarily 
prolong exposure to potential hazards. (see p. 17-18) 
(5) Federal funding for training for radiation monitor teams to measure 
radiation levels after an accident has declined since 1975 with the 
result that an effective radiation monitoring capability does not 
exist at the local level. (see p. 19) 
(6) Serious efforts at coordination between the nuclear facilities and 
off-site State and local emergency response agencies have been 
attempted. However I a comprehensive large scale test exercise 
involving a nuclear power plant and State and local emergency 
response organizations has never been conducted in the State. In 
spite of coordination efforts made so far I the problems that exist 
with the State's nuclear emergency preparedness would inhibit the 
effectiveness of the level of coordination that has been achieved. 
(see p. 19) 
(7) Although plans for emergency medical services have been developed 
and tested within hospitals I there is no coordinated plan for all 
medical response organizations within affected areas across county 
lines. Radiological training for medical personnel and ambulance 
crews has been limited or unavailable to an extent which would 
inhibit the effectiveness of emergency medical services in the event 
of a major nuclear accident. (see p. 21) 
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Bureau of Radi9logical Health (BRH) Staffing Levels Low 
Staffing levels for the BRH Radiation Control Program are below 
NRC minimum acceptable standards for participants in its Agreement 
State Program. The NRC standard for staffing levels is 1-1.5 person-
years per 100 licenses and 2-2.5 person-years for a major licensee, 
while BRH present staffing levels are . 6 person-years and 1. 2 person-
years respectively. Because of the BRH staff shortage, 20 inspections 
of radioactive material licensees are overdue. With the increasing 
growth in nuclear activity in the State, continued inadequate staffing 
levels can undermine the effectiveness of the State's Radiation Control 
Program. (see p. 26) 
Discrepancies Found in Inspections of Radioactive Material Licensees 
1969-1979 
In a sample of inspection records reviewed by the Audit Council, 
it was found that as the number of radioactive material licenses and 
inspections increased, the number of violations of State regulations and 
license conditions increased. Without adequate staff at the BRH to 
inspect for compliance with State regulations and license conditions, the 
potential for conditions that might be detrimental to public health and 
safety is greatly increased. (see p. 34) 
Inadequate Training for Drivers Hauling Radioactive Material 
There are no Federal or State regulations for standardized emer-
gency training of drivers ·who haul radioactive materials in the State. 
In the absence of adequate driver training if an accident occurs, the 
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exposure to potential radiation may be prolonged until properly trained 
personnel arrive at the site. (see p. 46) 
PSC Vehicle Inspection Program not Realizing Full Potential 
The Public Service Commission vehicle inspection program does not 
inspect for violations of DOT radiation safety regulations. Vehicles 
carrying radioactive materials are inspected only for compliance with 
DOT regulations which relate to overall vehicle safety I mechanical 
condition, vehicle licensing and other non-nuclear related criteria. 
When a carrier with a radioactive shipment is cited by PSC for a viola-
tion of DOT regulations, the BRH is not notified of the violation. 
Therefore 1 the State is not realizing the full potential of its inspection 
program to inspect for compliance with radiation safety regulations and 
to identify carriers and/or shippers of radioactive materials with a 
history of DOT violations for possible corrective action. (see p. 52) 
The State is Deficient in Providing Safeguards for the Transportation of 
Radioactive Materials 
The State has been deficient in providing adequate safeguards for 
the transportation of highly toxic radioactive materials because it has 
not coordinated its existing resources in a comprehensive statewide 
policy to provide for route planning, prior notification of a central 
emergency response authority or enroute surveillance assistance. The 
State has not identified the types and levels of all hazardous materials 
which should receive all or some of these considerations. The absence 
of this type of preparedness can hamper the State's ability to respond 
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effectively and efficiently to an accident/incident involving radioactive 
materials or other hazardous materials. (see p. 57) 
Lack of Plan for Distribution of Potassium Iodide 
The State does not have a plan for the emergency distribution of 
potassium iodide I which can effectively block the absorption of Iodine131 
CI131) by the thyroid gland in the event of a major accident at a nuclear 
power plant. There are also no provisions for obtaining an emergency 
supply of potassium iodide from the Food and Drug Administration or 
for distribution authority or liability. In the absence of a readily 
available supply of potassium iodide and plans for distribution I emergency 
response personnel who may encounter I131 could be unnecessarily 
exposed to a dangerous radiation dosage or emergency operations may 
be delayed in the presence of I131 . (see p. 65) 
BRH Daily Inspection Program of Radioactive Material Shipments at Chem-
Nuclear Systems I Inc. is an Effective Deterrent of Serious Violations 
In a review of BRH records of radioactive shipment inspections at 
Chern- Nuclear Systems I Inc. I the Audit Council found that when shipment 
inspection frequency increased from spot checks to daily inspection of 
all incoming shipments I the number of serious violations of DOT regula-
tions with the potential for posing a health and safety hazard to the 
public decreased from 36 in April 1979 to 7 in December 1979. The 
decrease in serious violations as inspections of shipments increased 
indicates the effectiveness· of the inspection program and its importance 
as a deterrent to unsafe practices. (see p. 81) 
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Accidents/Incidents Involving Radioactive Material in South Carolina 
Through December 1979, 104 non-military nuclear accidents/incidents 
were reported to and investigated by the BRH. Of these incidents 63 
were reported with radiation levels above normal background radiation 
which is . 01 mr. /hr. in South Carolina. However I only a small portion 
of these incidents posed a potential significant radiological hazard to the 
public health and safety. Incidents which posed a potential significant 
radiological hazard to the public were responded to and investigated by 
one or more members of the BRH Emergency Radiological Assistance 
Team (ERAT). None of the incidents reported to the BRH have required 
implementing the Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan. (see 
p. 90) 
Funds for Emergency Preparedness Declining 
Total funds for overall emergency preparedness have declined from 
FY 77 through FY 80 at a time when the level of potentially hazardous 
activity is increasing rapidly as the State continues its rapid industrial 
growth. The State has not developed a comprehensive policy for funding 
and budgeting for nuclear emergency preparedness or general emergency 
preparedness. The absence of such a comprehensive policy has resulted 
in the development of deficiencies in the level of preparedness 1 especially 
at the local level. (see p. 96) 
Conclusion 
The Audit Council's review of the State's nuclear emergency response 
capabilities revealed that a number of deficiencies exist that could 
inhibit the overall effectiveness of the State's capabilities to respond to 
a nuclear emergency. Many of these deficiencies are being addressed 
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by the Governor's Task Force and may be further improved by pending 
refinements in Federal Regulations. However, the history of Federal 
Government involvement in oversight of the nuclear industry has been 
plagued with vagueness I ineffectiveness I confusion I and contradictory 
policies among Federal agencies. It would be a mistake for South 
Carolina to rely solely on Federal initiatives and actions to provide 
adequate protection for public health and safety relating to potential 
nuclear hazards in South Carolina. 
As outlined on page 8 1 the Audit Council recommends that the 
General Assembly should take further action to develop a comprehensive 
policy for developing State nuclear emergency preparedness measures in 
the context of overall State disaster preparedness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Legislative Audit Council was asked by 99 members of the 
General Assembly to conduct a review of the State's preparedness in 
the event of a nuclear emergency (see Appendix 1). The request 
specifically asked for a summary of the types of potential nuclear related 
hazards, the State's response capabilities for each, a review of past 
nuclear incidents in the State, and an evaluation of the State's current 
capabilities for response to a nuclear emergency. 
This report does not attempt to present a case for either side of 
any of the many nuclear energy policy issues which are being discussed 
in South Carolina and elsewhere. The Council has attempted to provide 
an accurate and objective description of problems that were observed 
. 
during the evaluation of nuclear emergency preparedness_ while focusing 
on the three specific points cited in the request. The recommendations 
included are intended solely to address the problems that were found to 
exist and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear emergency 
preparedness in South Carolina. 
We do wish to point out one problem of a general and widespread 
nature that is not addressed in the body of the report. It will be 
evident to anyone who begins to study any aspect of nuclear energy 
and its relationship to public policy that the following characteristics 
exist: (1) Nuclear energy, its technology, and the related policy 
issues are complex and are not amenable to "quick" analysis and "instant" 
insights. (2) There is widespread and growing concern and involvement 
among public citizens, government officials, and industrial representa-
tives in many of the areas relating to nuclear energy development and 
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public safety. (3) In spite of the increased public awareness and 
efforts to educate the public about nuclear energy, there exists a great 
deal of misunderstanding and misinformation about nuclear energy and 
hazards associated with radiation. Improvement in the level of under-
standing about nuclear energy and its related issues, such as radiation 
hazards and nuclear emergency preparedness, will require a major and 
continuing effort to inform and educate the public and public officials. 
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SCOPE AND METHODS 
The Audit Council began the study with an extensive review of 
research relating to nuclear accidents and nuclear emergency prepared-
ness published by the United States General Accounting Office, other 
Federal sources, and sources not directly affiliated with government. 
These sources cited many types of problems which have been observed 
in the recent history of nuclear energy development. The Audit Council's 
review then attempted to identify whether these same or similar problems 
exist in South Carolina. 
The field study began by focusing on State and local level emergency 
preparedness in the event of a radiological hazard involving a nuclear 
power plant. The Audit Council staff visited the Oconee Nuclear Power 
Station in coordination with the Governor's Task Force for Emergency 
Response Capabilities in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities. The staff 
observed the fieldwork of the Task Force and reviewed their reports. 
In addition, the Audit Council staff attended each of the public hearings 
on nuclear emergency preparedness held around the State by the Joint 
Legislative Committee on Energy. 
State and Federal laws, rules and regulations relating to all aspects 
of nuclear energy oversight, control, licensing, inspections, and emer-
gency preparedness were reviewed. The activities of State agencies 
with designated roles in the area of nuclear energy were reviewed to 
assess compliance with the applicable laws, rules and regulations. The 
records of State agencies· which have a nuclear emergency response 
mandate were examined in order to inventory the types, number, and 
level of hazard associated with incidents or accidents involving radiological 
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materials that have occurred in South Carolina. This analysis also 
involved reviewing the types of responses to the incidents. The report 
is organized in three sections which ~orrespond to the three questions 
cited in the request. The first section consists of the Major Finding 
and Recommendations which deal with the adequacy of the State's nuclear 
emergency response capability. This section also discusses the State's 
liGensing and inspection program. The second section reviews the 
types of potential nuclear hazards in the State and the existing response 
capabilities for each. The third section discusses the types and number 
of nuclear-related incidents that have occurred and how they were 
handled. It also briefly discusses costs and budgeting relating to 
nuclear emergency preparedness. 
As the Audit Council began its investigation I the Governor's Task 
Force for Emergency Response Capabilities in Support of Fixed Nuclear 
Facilities (hereinafter I Governor's Task Force) I and the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Energy also were initiating comprehensive studies into 
nuclear emergency preparedness in South Carolina. These studies are 
still underway. The three investigations have been coordinated in 
areas where appropriate so as to prevent unnecessary duplication and 
enhance the General Assembly's ability to provide appropriate legislative 
support and direction to the improvement of nuclear emergency prepared-
ness in South Carolina. 
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SECTION ONE 
STATE AND LOCAL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMM:ENDATIONS 
This section has two parts. The first deals with State and local 
nuclear emergency response capabilities. The second discusses the 
State's licensing and inspection program for handlers of radioactive 
material. The Audit Council considers licensing and inspection to be 
related to emergency preparedness because they can be effective in 
preventing emergencies. 
Introduction to Nuclear Emergency Preparedness 
The Audit Council's review focused on nuclear emergency prepared-
ness and related areas of oversight, licensing, inspection and control of 
radioactive materials. It must be emphasized that emergency prepared-
ness for an accident or incident involving radioactive material is only 
one consideration or component of overall preparedness in the event of 
any type of emergency. The basic principles of emergency response 
capability are the same for almost all large-scale emergency situations 
including earthquakes and hurricanes, as well as man -made disasters. 
Therefore, it is important that nuclear emergency preparedness continue 
to be developed as an integral part of the State's overall emergency 
preparedness planning. 
The problems and recommended solutions outlined below, although 
directed specifically toward nuclear emergency preparedness are intended 
to be viewed in the context of how they fit into the State's overall 
readiness for response to an emergency situation. 
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In addition, many of the problems discussed below are being 
addressed by the Governor's Task Force. The Task Force is made up 
of key State officials representing a~l State agencies that have a role in 
emergency preparedness. The Task Force has thus been able to bring 
together these senior officials and the personnel resources available in 
each of their respective State agencies to conduct a thorough evaluation 
of nuclear emergency preparedness. The staff observed the work of 
the Governor's Task Force while accompanying the Task Force into the 
field evaluations at the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, Oconee County 
and Pickens County. The Audit Council staff identified similar problems 
and arrived at conclusions similar to those developed by the Task Force 
regarding the inadequacies of the State's nuclear emergency preparedness. 
Their draft report, prepared by teams in the field and presented to the 
full Task Force, contained a detailed and candid listing and discussion 
of the deficiencies that were found. Detailed recommendations for 
corrective action also were included. The Audit Council staff concurred 
fully with the Task Force report and its recommendations, although a 
few of the recommendations have been expanded in this report. 
After the draft report by the Governor's Task Force from the first 
field evaluation was completed, the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy 
held public hearings in counties where fixed nuclear facilities are located. 
County Disaster Preparedness officials, law enforcement personnel, 
county and municipal government officials, Federal officials, and nuclear 
industry representatives began to reveal that a pattern of the problems 
identified by the Task Force existed around the State. As this consistent 
pattern of problems emerged, the Governor's Task Force expanded its 
focus to develop and implement new policies and procedures. These 
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were designed to correct the problems that had been found to exist at 
both the State and local level in regard to nuclear emergency prepared-
ness around fixed nuclear facilities. Because of the volume of corrective 
action being attempted and because the Audit Council is in agreement 
with the actions being taken and being recommended by the Task Force I 
it became no longer productive for the Audit Council to continue evalu-
ating at the local level during implementation of changes. Therefore I 
we suspended our field evaluation at the local level and focused on the 
remaining questions in the audit request. 
The Council feels that the inadequacies at the local level I when 
viewed together I are serious enough in nature to comprise a potential 
major problem. These circumstances inhibit the ability of the State to 
ensure that the public is protected from potential hazards with maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness. In this section we treat the inadequacies 
found in the evaluation of local level preparedness as a major finding. 
The report by the Governor's Task Force discusses the details of the 
deficiencies and recommendations thoroughly. Accordingly 1 we have 
attempted in this section only to summarize the general nature of the 
problems cited in each of the nine emergency preparedness categories 
examined. 
The Audit Council has added certain recommendations for considera-
tion by the General Assembly which are intended to complement the 
recommendations of the Task Force. Some recommendations are presented 
as policy options for the Legislature to consider in improving the State's 
overall preparedness to deal as efficiently and effectively as possible 
with nuclear and other emergencies. The most important of these 
proposals is presented immediately below. A summary of the Audit 
-7-
Council recommendations relating to State and local level nuclear emer-
gency preparedness and the recommendations from the Task Force are 
consolidated at the end of this section. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
ESTABLISHING THE FOLLOWING: STATEWIDE 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF NUCLEAR AND GENERAL 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, A TIMETABLE FOR 
ACHIEVING THESE STANDARDS, PRIORITIES OF 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS NEEDS BASED ON 
LOCALE AND PROBABILITY OF EXPOSURE TO A 
HAZARD 1 A SYSTEM FOR ON -GOING INSPECTION 
TO ENSURE THAT THE STANDARDS ARE MAIN-
TAINED AND THAT THE STANDARDS REMAIN 
ADEQUATE. THE FUNDING LEVELS NECESSARY 
TO ACHIEVE THE STANDARDS SHOULD ALSO BE 
IDENTIFIED. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD AUTHORIZE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE 
FUNDING FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, STATE 
GOVERNMENT I THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT I AND 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO MAINTAIN AN ACCEPT-
ABLE LEVEL OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. 
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THE LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL SHOULD BE 
DIRECTED TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CHANGES MADE BASED ON THE ACTIONS OF THE 
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE WITHIN ONE TO TWO 
YEARS FROM THE TIME THE CHANGES ARE 
ENFORCED. 
Summary of Inadequacies in State and Local Level Preparedness in the 
Event of a Major Accident at a Fixed Nuclear Facility in South Carolina 
There are several basic criteria which can be used to assess the 
quality of a general state of preparedness for a nuclear emergency or 
other emergencies. These criteria are listed below with a general 
comment as to the nature of the problems found to exist in each of 
these areas in South Carolina. 
Is There an Effective Systematic Evaluation and Testing Program Which 
Periodically Measures the General State of Readiness for Emergency 
Response? 
Prior to the activation of the Governor's Task Force the State did 
not have an agency or procedure requiring the conduct of a periodic 
comprehensive review and testing of Annex B (Peacetime Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan) of the Comprehensive Disaster Preparedness 
Plan for the State of South Carolina. The Governor's Task Force, in 
1979, began a comprehensive review of Annex B and a thorough field 
evaluation of each of its components involving State and local level 
nuclear emergency response capabilities. Based on the problems revealed 
during this evaluation, the Task Force expanded its scope to review 
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and revise the entire State plan, as well as to begin work on correcting 
the deficiencies found in the area of nuclear emergency preparedness 
and other areas. As part of its corrective work the Task Force also 
has established direct coordination with representatives from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). This is significant because during the 
Summer and Fall of 1979 the Federal Government began to implement 
many major changes in nuclear safety regulations and nuclear emerg-ency 
preparedness requirements. 
The Audit Council concluded after observation of these activities 
that the Governor's Task Force is carrying out an effective, well-managed 
and well-coordinated review process. When the Task Force also began 
implementing modifications to the existing plans and procedures, the 
Audit Council suspended its evaluation work in the area of State and 
local level radiological emergency preparedness around fixed nuclear 
facilities . 
Is There a Comprehensive Up-to-date Plan for a Radiological Emergency? 
The Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) under the State Department 
of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) maintains and implements 
the Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan which is a part of 
the State's Comprehensive Disaster Preparedness Plan. The plan was 
concurred with by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in November 
1977 and is one from only 14 states which has received NRC concurrence. 
During the hearings before the Joint Legislative Committee on 
Energy (JLCE), Federal officials from the NRC and the Department of 
Energy (DOE) testified that the South Carolina nuclear emergency 
preparedness plan was an excellent plan and recommended that it be 
copied and adapted for use in other states. 
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However I during the field evaluation by the Governor's Task Force 
and during the hearings held by the JLCE certain problems were brought 
to light by county and municipal officials I State and local Disaster 
Preparedness officials 1 law enforcement personnel and other emergency 
personnel I and private citizens. These problems would inhibit the 
efficiency and effectiveness of response to a nuclear emergency and are 
summarized in the following pages. They are discussed in detail in the 
reports prepared by the Governor's Task Force. 
In addition I the Audit Council feels that the State needs to develop 
a more formal and stringent requirement for immediate notification to the 
State of all unusual occurrences in a nuclear facility which directly 
relate to any operation involving radioactive material. For example I the 
BRH as part of the Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan I 
has developed a Memorandum of Understanding between DHEC and six 
of the State's seven major handlers of bulk radioactive materials. 
There is a similar agreement with the seventh facility which is the 
Savannah River Plant. The Savannah Plant is designated as the Regional 
Coordinating Office for the Energy Research and Development Agency in 
implementing Interagency Radiological Assistance Plans for five South-
eastern states including South Carolina. In discussing notification to 
the State I the language of the Memorandum does not require that notice 
be given about all non-routine incidents or occurrences which directly I 
or indirectly I may involve radioactive material. Appendix 2 is a sample 
of a Memorandum of Understanding. The specific language at issue 
states: 
It is further agreed that ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR 
SERVICES will immediately notify the SOUTH CAROLINA 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTROL through its DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL 
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HEALTH in the event of a nuclear facility radiological 
incident or in the event of a transportation incident, 
within ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES' 
responsibility, which has the potential for or does 
involve the health and safety of the citizens of 
South Carolina outside the facility boundaries I or 
which may or does involve abnormal contamination 
levels in the environment outside the facility environ-
ment. This agreement does not prohibit the notifica-
tion of local emergency organizations in the event 
that this is deemed an expedient measure by appropri-
ate facility personnel. This agreement shall commence 
with the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding 
and shall continue until expressly revoked. [Emphasis 
Added] 
The Director and staff of the BRH indicate that the managers of 
the State's nuclear facilities have been cooperative in this regard. 
However I questions about the priorities and circumstances of notification 
to the State of an unusual occurrence have been a consistent problem 
cited by the General Accounting Office and became a significant issue 
during and after the recent accident at Three-Mile Island in Pennsylvania. 
First, precise and detailed definitions of classes of non-routine 
"incidents" or "occurrences" involving radioactive materials which require 
notification to the State should be established. The language of the 
Memorandum then should be modified to require immediate notification to 
the State of all of these unusual incidents or occurrences at the facility 
which involve radioactive materials. One suggested way of rephrasing 
the notification requirement to achieve an improved assurance of immediate 
notification is: 
It is further agreed that ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR 
SERVICES will immediately notify the SOUTH CAROLINA 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTROL through its DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL 
HEALTH in the event of all nuclear facility radiological 
accidents/incidents or in the event of a transportation 
accident/incident within ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR 
SERVICES' responsibility. In addition, ALLIED-GENERAL 
NUCLEAR SERVICES will immediately notify the 
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL through its DIVISION 
OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH in the event of a 
nuclear facility radiological incident or in the event 
of a transportation incident within ALLIED-GENERAL 
NUCLEAR SERVICES' responsibility, which has the 
potential for or does involve the health and safety 
of the citizens of South Carolina outside the facility 
boundaries, or which may or does involve abnormal 
contamination levels in the environment outside the 
facility environment. This agreement does not 
prohibit the notification of local emergency organiza-
tions in the event that this is deemed an expedient 
measure by appropriate facility personnel. This 
agreement shall commence with the signing of this 
Memorandum of Understanding and shall continue 
until expressly revoked. [Emphasis Added] 
There are several benefits to be gained from expanding the notifi-
cation procedures to include all non-routine incidents or occurrences. 
(1) The expanded procedures will tend to keep the emergency notifica-
tion system more visible to its users and help to establish and 
reinforce the precedent of notifying the State immediately when 
problems occur. 
(2) The expanded notification procedures will provide a higher level of 
preparedness and thus, also provide improved protection for both 
the State and the nuclear facility. 
(3) The expansion will facilitate communication between nuclear facility 
personnel and emergency response personnel who might otherwise 
seldom have contact except in the case of an incident requiring an 
emergency response or during scheduled test/training exercises 
which are infrequent. 
( 4) The expanded requirement will provide more frequent unscheduled 
tests of the emergency communications procedures. 
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(5) The expansion will provide "live" training experience for the 
emergency response personnel I which will be beneficial even if it 
only entails participating in the notification process. 
(6) The expanded notification requirement will help to establish a 
record of the volume and types of "routine" and non-routine 
problems which occur at each type of nuclear facility. This can 
be a guide for planning and ensuring the adequacy of the State's 
nuclear emergency response capability. In addition I this type of 
record-keeping allows a comparison of the volume and types of 
non-routine incidents or occurrences which happen at nuclear 
facilities within the State and nationally. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN 
THE STATE AND NUCLEAR F AGILITIES LOCATED 
IN THE STATE SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO REQUIRE 
IMMEDIATE REPORTING OF ALL NON-ROUTINE 
INCIDENTS OR OCCURRENCES AT A NUCLEAR 
FACILITY WHICH DIRECTLY RELATE TO ANY 
OPERATION INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. 
Are There Adequate Warning and Evacuation Resources and Procedures to 
Effectively Alert and Evacuate the Public if Necessary in Response to a 
Radiological Emergency? 
"Warning" is defined as providing the public initial notification that 
a potential or actual emergency exists and directing them to a specific 
(predesignated) source of information (e.g. I radio and/or television) 
for guidance as to what action they should take. "Evacuation" refers 
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to the removal of all persons from an area which contains an actual 
hazard to the public or is imminently threatened by such a hazard. 
In the field evaluation of the first two counties I it was found that 
there are no warning systems in either county in the vicinity of the 
nuclear power plant. Plans and procedures for effecting an evacuation 
were found to be uncoordinated and vague. Adequate State and local 
resources appear to be available for carrying out an evacuation if 
required. However 1 the absence of a public warning system I the 
failure to distribute emergency-related information to residents in the 
vicinity of the nuclear facility I and the lack of detailed plans for coordi-
nating warning and evacuation steps would cause delay 1 inefficiency I 
and confusion if evacuation were necessary. Such circumstances would 
result in needlessly prolonging the exposure of the affected populace to 
the hazard or potential hazard. 
Testimony before the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy from 
local officials in other areas of the State indicated that these problems 
exist throughout the State. 
An additional problem may hamper efforts to improve emergency 
warning and/or evacuation systems. The availability of Federal matching 
funds for counties to purchase warning devices and other emergency 
equipment has been declining rapidly during the last four years. 
According to officials from the State Emergency Preparedness Division 
(EPD) I there are no Federal funds available for purchase of emergency 
equipment in FY 80. Many local officials testified before the Joint 
Legislative Committee on Energy that their counties in the past had not 
been able to obtain Federal funds because the counties could not afford 
to provide their share of the money (50% match) required to obtain a 
Federal grant for equipment purchases. 
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The Governor's Task Force is developing recommendations for each 
county that has these problems. The recommendations suggest procedures 
to be initiated which will provide funding for the purchase of needed 
equipment. 
Is There Sufficient Coordination Among Law Enforcement Agencies to 
Provide Adequate Evacuation Traffic Control? 
Municipal, county and State law enforcement agencies are accustomed 
to close coordination and communication with each other on a regular 
basis. However, several weaknesses in preparedness for evacuation 
were revealed during the field evaluation and during the hearings 
before the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. The problems and 
recommendations are discussed in detail in the report by the Governor's 
Task Force. The Audit Council supports the recommendations of the 
Task Force in this area. The problems that were found are presented 
in summary below. 
With few exceptions, there has been no formal or informal compre-
hensive planning for coordination of a mass evacuation within a 5 or 
10-mile radius from the State's fixed nuclear facilities among State, 
county and municipal law enforcement agencies. This type of planning 
should include steps such as establishing predesignated primary and 
alternate evacuation routes, traffic control points, and holding areas for 
contaminated persons. 
The absence of this type of planning can cause delay which could 
unnecessarily prolong the exposure of the public to a hazard or potential 
hazard in the event that a mass evacuation were necessary. The problems 
cited previously regarding deficiencies in resources for warning the 
public could contribute to further delays and confusion. 
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In addition, the Task Force noted the potential for over-extending 
the locally available law enforcement personnel, in the event an evacuation 
is ordered, because they are expected to provide both evacuation 
traffic control as well as to assist in door-to-door warning to the public. 
A detailed discussion of the types of problems found to exist in 
the area of evacuation traffic control and recommended corrective measures 
is contained in the Governor's Task Force report. 
Are Emergency Transportation Services Adequate to Support the Movement 
of Personnel and Emergency Material in the Event that Evacuation Becomes 
Necessary? 
Plans for emergency transportation services to support an evacuation 
depend on the use of school buses and students who currently are 
school bus drivers. The following deficiencies were found in the first 
two counties examined. First, there was no comprehensive detailed 
operations plan for emergency transportation. Second, since the majority 
of school bus drivers are students I their availability during summer 
months is questionable and no alternate drivers have been designated. 
Parental concern also may limit the availability of student drivers in the 
event of a radiological disaster requiring evacuation. There is only a 
remote possibility that allowable stay-time criteria might become a factor 
if an evacuation were necessary. Nevertheless I the amount of time a 
person can spend exposed to a radioactive source without exceeding 
safe exposure levels is shorter for younger people than for older people. 
Third, no information has been disseminated to the public regarding 
plans for emergency transportation services and no test exercises or 
other operational training activities have been conducted. 
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These same deficiencies were cited to the Joint Legislative Committee 
on Energy by officials from other areas of the State. These problems 
and recommended corrective measures are discussed in detail in the 
report by the Governor's Task Force. 
Is There an Adequate Level of Preparedness for the Provision of Emer-
gency Welfare Services in the Event of a Nuclear Emergency? 
The State Comprehensive Disaster Plan cites emergency welfare 
services as including (1) sheltering, (2) feeding, (3) clothing, ( 4) 
registration, (5) information and referral, and (6) emergency social 
services. Agencies listed in the State plan with support responsibilities 
for emergency welfare services are the State Department of Social 
Services, State Department of Education, Adjutant General, American 
National Red Cross, and the Salvation Army. 
The field evaluation of the first two counties found that there was 
no detailed operational plan of action for delivery of emergency welfare 
services in response to a nuclear accident/incident. In addition, the 
local agencies which would be expected to provide these services had 
not been involved in development of the general county plans for 
delivering· emergency welfare services in a nuclear emergency. 
These problems also were cited as statewide problems in presenta-
tions by local officials to the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. 
The Department of Social Services in conjunction with the Task 
Force has begun corrective action to address these inadequacies. The 
problems and the recommended corrective measures are discussed in 
detail in the report by the Governor's Task Force. 
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Are the Numbers of Trained Radiation Monitors Adequate for a Nuclear 
Emergency? 
The role of radiation monitor teams is to (1) detect and measure 
levels of radiation by direct monitoring with radiation detection instruments 
and/or collection of air, water and soil samples, and (2) prepare maps 
showing location, levels and types of contamination. The source of 
training for these personnel in the past has been from the training 
program for civil preparedness in the event of a nuclear attack, the 
Radiological Defense Program (RADEF). This is a 100% federally funded 
program where the available Federal funds have been reduced by approxi-
mately 20% since 1975 not including the impact of inflation. Part of the 
effect of the limited resources for training personnel to become radiation 
monitors has been that the first two counties evaluated do not have a 
sufficient number of trained personnel to support either a peace-time or 
a war-time RADEF response plan. The funds previously available to 
pay an instructor to teach the 40-hour Radiological Monitor training 
course are no longer obtainable which has significantly reduced the 
availability of qualified instructors. 
This deficiency led the Task Force to conclude that "no effective 
peace-time RADEF capability exists" in the first two counties examined. 
This problem also was cited by local officials in the hearings held by 
the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. 
Is Coordination Between Nuclear Facilities and Off-site State and Local 
Agencies and Organizations Adequate to Effectively Deal with a Nuclear 
Emergency? 
Close coordination and cooperation between the nuclear facility and 
off-site State and local agencies and organizations in preparing for 
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emergency operations is essential to having an effective emergency 
response capability. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commisf?ion (NRC) requires that nuclear 
facilities' emergency plans be approved before an operating license is 
issued. Facility emergency plans must include provisions for developing 
a coordinated off-site response capability with State and local agencies. 
Part of the effect of NRC requirements for nuclear facilities has 
been that in the first two counties evaluated serious efforts have been 
made by the facility to assist various local organizations to develop an 
effective, well-coordinated emergency response capability. This assist-
ance has included periodic training as well as financial assistance. 
In addition, the facilities have cooperated with the State through 
signing formal agreements regarding notification and mutual assistance 
in the event of an emergency. Although nuclear facilities have con-
ducted emergency training and test drills in accordance with NRC 
requirements, the scope of the drills and level of participation by State 
and local groups has been limited. A comprehensive large-scale test 
exercise involving a nuclear power plant and State and local emergency 
response organizations has never been conducted in the State. 
These findings have led the Task Force to conclude that serious 
efforts have been made by the Oconee nuclear facility to cooperate and 
coordinate with State and local agencies that would respond to a nuclear 
emergency at the plant. Similar efforts by the managers at other 
nuclear facilities to help develop effective off-site emergency response 
capabilities were cited by local officials at the hearings held by the 
Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. 
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In spite of the coordination efforts that have been made so far, 
the problems that exist in the State's nuclear emergency preparedness 
would inhibit the effectiveness of the minimum level of coordination and 
cooperation that has been achieved. The Audit Council has expanded 
its recommendation significantly beyond that of the Governor's Task 
Force in this area in one specific regard. The Task Force report 
(draft) concluded that "notification will and should be dependent on the 
professional judgment of facility operators regarding the potential of an 
incident, in its initial stages, to escalate and cause an off-site hazard 
to the population." [Emphasis Added] 
The Audit Council believes that off-site coordination and emergency 
response capabilities can be made more effective through requiring 
off-site notification of all non -routine occurrences involving radioactive 
material. This recommendation is discussed in detail on page 11. 
Are the Existing Emergency Medical Resources Adequate to Provide an 
Efficient and Effective Response to a Nuclear Emergency? 
A major component in emergency preparedness is the response 
capability of local medical service organizations, including hospitals, 
health departments, rescue squads and ambulance services. The coordi-
nation between these and other response agencies is also important for 
effective response to a radiological emergency. Of equal importance is 
the radiological emergency training that personnel of these medical 
response organizations receive in the treatment of contaminated patients 
and the use of radiation monitoring equipment. Nuclear facility emergency 
plans are required by the NRC to include provisions for emergency 
response by local medical organizations for assistance during a radiological 
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emergency in transporting patients, treating patients contaminated by 
radioactive materials and evacuating hospitals, if evacuation is required. 
The NRC requirement has resulted_ in the three hospitals, all ambulance 
services and rescue squads in the two counties examined having a 
designated role in the local plans for responding to a radiological emer-
gency at the Oconee Station. Although plans for medical emergency 
response have been developed and tested within the hospitals, a compre-
hensive plan for the coordination of all medical services with other 
response activities within the two counties and provisions for the evacua-
tion of an entire hospital, if required, does not exist. For example, 
Oconee Memorial Hospital is within a ten-mile radius of the Oconee 
Nuclear Power Station. 
In addition, radiological emergency training has been received only 
by the hospital staff radiologists. No formal training has been received 
by ambulance personnel in either the care or transportation of contami-
nated patients and only a limited number of personnel in each county 
have received any training in the use of radiation monitoring equipment. 
This equipment has not been assigned specifically to any ambulances for 
use in a nuclear emergency. 
In its report the Governor's Task Force has recommended that 
county medical response organizations and county civil defense directors 
work in close coordination to develop training programs and plans for 
guidance and assistance in emergency operation "in order to provide for 
greater coordination of medical response activities with the overall 
conduct of county emergency operations. " Lack of coordination between 
medical response organizations and other county response organizations, 
as well as the need for more training and equipment for emergency 
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response personnel, were also cited by local county and medical services 
officials in hearings before the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy. 
RECO:M:MENDATIONS 
THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE SHOULD COMPLETE 
ITS COMPREHENSIVE FIELD EVALUATION OF 
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT THE 
STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL AND CONTINUE THE 
PREPARATION OF RECO:M:MENDATIONS FOR 
IMPROVING THE OVERALL QUALITY OF EMER-
GENCY PREPAREDNESS AND NUCLEAR EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES. 
THE RESULTS OF THEIR REVIEW SHOULD BE 
RECORDED AS A BENCHMARK AGAINST WHICH TO 
MEASURE FUTURE EVALUATIONS INTENDED TO 
ASSESS WHETHER DESIRED IMPROVEMENTS ARE 
BEING ACHIEVED. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
REQUIRING THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDER-
STANDING BETWEEN THE STATE AND NUCLEAR 
F AGILITIES LOCATED IN THE STATE BE MODIFIED 
TO REQUIRE Il\1MEDIATE REPORTING OF ALL 
NON-ROUTINE INCIDENTS OR OCCURRENCES AT A 
NUCLEAR FACILITY WHICH DIRECTLY RELATE TO 
ANY OPERATION INVOLVING NUCLEAR MATERIAL. 
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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD MONITOR AND 
BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE ASSIST-
ANCE WHERE APPROPRIATE IN THE FOLLOWING 
AREAS WHERE DEFICIENCIES HAVE BEEN FOUND 
IN NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES. 
(1) ESTABLISHING ADEQUATE EMERGENCY WARNING 
SYSTEMS AND EVACUATION PROCEDURES IN 
A TEN-MILE RADIUS AROUND THE STATE'S 
FIXED NUCLEAR F AGILITIES. 
(2) IMPROVING THE COORDINATION AND PLAN-
NING FOR EVACUATION TRAFFIC CONTROL 
AND EVACUATION WARNING ASSISTANCE IN 
A TEN-MILE RADIUS AROUND THE STATE'S 
FIXED NUCLEAR F AGILITIES. 
(3) IMPROVING EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICES FOR PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL 
WITHIN A TEN-MILE RADIUS AROUND THE 
STATE'S FIXED NUCLEAR FACILITIES. 
(4) IMPROVING THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE 
EMERGENCY WELFARE SERVICES AT SITES 
LOCATED OUTSIDE A TEN-MILE RADIUS. 
FROM THE STATE'S FIXED NUCLEAR 
F AGILITIES. 
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(5) ESTABLISHING AN EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE 
RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY FOR 
WAR-TIME AND PEACE-TIME WITHIN A TEN-
MILE RADIUS OF EACH OF THE STATE'S 
FIXED NUCLEAR FACILITIES. 
(6) IMPROVING THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION 
AND COORDINATION BETWEEN THE STATE'S 
NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND OFF-SITE STATE 
AND LOCAL AGENCIES TO AID IN IMPROVING 
THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY 
TO AN EMERGENCY SITUATION AT A FIXED 
NUCLEAR FACILITY. 
(7) IMPROVING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR EMER-
GENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 
WITHIN A TEN -MILE RADIUS AROUND THE 
STATE'S FIXED NUCLEAR FACILITIES. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
ESTABLISHING A POLICY WHEREBY THE OFFICE 
OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEVELOPS A 
SCHEDULE OF ANNOUNCED AND UNANNOUNCED 
INSPECTIONS AND OPERATIONAL TESTS (WHERE 
APPROPRIATE) OF THE STATE'S EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS INVOLVING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES WHICH HOLD 
NUCLEAR MATERIALS LICENSES TO BE CONDUCTED 
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PERIODICALLY THROUGHOUT EACH YEAR. BIEN-
NIALLY, A REPORT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE OFFICE OF 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SHOWING THE RESULTS 
OF ALL INSPECTIONS AND TESTS, THE NATURE 
AND SCOPE OF EACH INSPECTION AND TEST, 
PARTIES INVOLVED, STRENGTHS AND DEFICIENCIES 
FOUND, AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. THE 
REPORT ALSO SHOULD SHOW THE AMOUNT OF 
ALL FUNDS, INCLUDING STATE, FEDERAL, AND 
OTHER, EXPENDED IN THE STATE EACH YEAR 
FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND DISPLAY 
ALL REVENUE SOURCES FOR THESE EXPENDITURES. 
THE REPORT ALSO SHOULD CONTAIN RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION WHERE NEEDED 
TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
CAPABILITIES TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD DIRECT A 
PERIODIC REVIEW OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF 
THE INSPECTION AND TESTING PROGRAM CITED 
IN THE RECOMMENDATION ABOVE, AND SUBMIT A 
REPORT ON THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE PROGRAM TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
BIENNIALLY. 
-26-
The State's Licensing and Inspection Program for Handlers of Radioac:tive 
Material in South Carolina 
The Audit Council reviewed the inspection criteria and procedures 
used by the Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) in determining compliance 
by radiological material licensees with State and Federal regulations and 
license requirements. Included in this review was an examination of a 
sample of inspections conducted by the BRH of major types of licensees 
(1969-1979) with an inventory of the types of compliance violations. 
The South Carolina Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act of 
1967, as amended, and an agreement between the State of South Carolina 
and the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission) in 1969 gave the authority to the Department of Health and 
Environmental Control to regulate the possession and use of all radiation 
sources. Pursuant to the Agreement with AEC, the Bureau of Radiological 
Health (BRH) began licensing for the receipt, use, possession and 
transfer of any source of ionizing radiation not reserved for NRC 
licensing in 1969. 
Types of radioactive material licenses are grouped into four major 
categories: academic, medical, industrial and other. These major 
groups are further sub-divided into more specific categories. Medical 
licenses are in four categories: (1) nuclear medicine, (2) pathology, 
(3) teletherapy, and ( 4) pacemaker licenses. Industrial licenses include 
(1) gamma irradiator, (2) radiography, (3) gauge and device, and (4) 
small gauge and device licenses. Academic licenses are only defined as 
academic small quantity. Other licenses include (1) waste burial, (2) 
waste collection, (3) laundries, and ( 4) service licenses. 
The total number of licenses in effect at the end of each calendar 
year has risen from 129 in 1969 to 282 in 1979 with increased usage of 
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radioactive materials (see Table 1). The increases in the number of 
licenses issued has brought with it increased responsibilities for the 
BRH staff as inspections of all licensees are required by the NRC of an 
Agreement State at specified intervals of from six months to three 
years. 
TABLE 1 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL LICENSES 
END OF EACH YEAR 
1969-1979(1) 
Year Number of Licenses 
1969 129 
1970 146 
1971 168 
1972 172 
1973 179 
1974 190 
1975 202 
1976 225 
1977 258 
1978 263 
1979 282 
(l)The number of licenses per year represents the number of licenses 
in effect on December 31 of that year. During the course of each 
year, licenses are terminated and along with termination, additional 
responsibilities by the BRH are required to assure that radioactive 
sources are disposed of in a safe manner. These responsibilities 
are not reflected in the war kload required of the figures above. In 
addition to the 282 licenses in effect on December 31, 1979, 142 
licenses were issued and terminated between 1969 and 1979. 
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Radioactive material license inspections are performed within certain 
time intervals based on the type of the license and priority assigned to 
it. Priorities for scheduling of inspections are determined by the type 
of material, quantity and use authorized by the license and the potential 
health hazard. Priority I licensees are inspected every six months with 
no extension in inspection frequency. The Chern Nuclear waste burial 
facility is the only Priority I licensee in the State at this time. Priority II 
licensees include gamma irradiators, radiographers, waste collection 
licensees and nuclear laundries. These licensees are inspected every 12 
months, though inspection frequency may be extended to 18 months. 
Priority III licensees include all medical licensees and licenses for gauges 
and devices and are inspected every two years with extensions allowed 
of one additional year to three years. Priority IV licensees include 
small quantity gauges and devices, academic and service licensees. 
These licensees are inspected every three years, though extensions of 
an additional one year may be allowed to decrease frequency to four 
years. Inspections are overdue if extension periods are exceeded. 
The BRH currently has 3. 3 staff members qualified to conduct 
inspections. The BRH licensing and inspection program is evaluated 
annually by a team from the NRC Office of State Programs. The evalu-
ation assesses whether the State inspection and licensing program is 
compatible with the NRC regulatory program and adequate to protect 
the public health and safety. Major areas reviewed in the annual 
inspection include organization, management and administration, person-
nel, regulations, licensing . and compliance. 
An inspection of the BRH Radiation Control Program was conducted 
by the NRC in February 1980. Audit Council staff attended the exit 
-29-
conference in which NRC inspectors reviewed their findings with the 
staff of the BRH. The NRC found the BRH program to be compatible 
with NRC guides and adequate to p~otect the public health and safety. 
However, the inspectors found that the BRH does not meet NRC minimum 
requirements for personnel and person-years for the regulatory program. 
The staff must be adequate in number to assure timely licensing, inspec-
tion and enforcement actions of high quality to protect the public health 
and safety. The specific NRC standard for minimum acceptable staffing 
level is 1-1.5 person-years per 100 licenses in effect and 2-2.5 person-
years for a major licensee, e.g. , a low level commercial waste burial 
site. The BRH staffing levels were low in both cases with only . 6 
person -years per 100 licenses (excluding the waste burial site) and 1. 2 
person-years for the State's major licensee, Chern Nuclear Systems, Inc. 
waste burial facility. 
The NRC inspectors stated that when three new staff members of 
the BRH (one health physicist, two health physicist technicians) are 
fully trained, the BRH will be within staff-year guidelines. However, 
attrition, training of new staff I and expanding regulatory activities 
could again reduce staff-years available for regulatory activities to 
below NRC guidelines. The NRC inspectors recommended that the BRH 
carefully monitor budget and staffing levels to avoid possible significant 
problems in implementing an effective radiation control program. 
The NRC inspectors provided a favorable general evaluation of the 
BRH inspection program with the one warning regarding overextension 
of the inspection staff. However 1 the NRC evaluation process for 
agreement states has itself received criticism from the General Accounting 
Office. GAO also noted that some hazardous materials are outside the 
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statutory authority of the NRC. For example, naturally occurring and 
accelerator-produced radioactive materials (NARM) and non-ionizing 
sources of radiation are not under NRC regulatory control. Included in 
NARM is Radium (RA226) which is one of the most hazardous radioactive 
materials. It is used, according to GAO, in approximately 85,000 
medical treatments in the nation annually. It also is used in a large 
number of industrial and military applications and in consumer items 
such as smoke detectors . 
At the State's initiative, through the BRH, South Carolina's licensing 
program was expanded to include NARM. However, this program was 
not evaluated by the NRC inspection team since they have no statutory 
authority for NARM. 
Following is a summary of the criticisms GAO made of the NRC 
licensing evaluation process. 
(1) Although State agencies are advised of NRC's determination of 
adequacy and compatibility with NRC's program and given general 
recommendations on how to improve their programs, they are not 
provided NRC's written evaluation reports which contain specific 
information on the problems identified during evaluations. 
(2) "Although NRC has a guide for evaluating agreement State radiation 
control programs, determining adequacy and compatibility is left to 
the judgment of each evaluator. We (GAO) could not determine 
from reviewing NRC's evaluation reports how the final assessment 
was made for measuring adequacy and compatibility." 
(3) "Several NRC evaluators said that, when deficiencies needing 
correction are noted in a license review, they inform the State 
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staff during the review. However, they do not determine whether 
corrective action is taken by the State. " 
( 4) Federal support of State efforts in radiation control programs in 
general has been minimal. NRC, for example, provides no funding 
to the states and therefore has available only the extreme sanction 
of terminating the agreement with a state. 
The NRC inspectors complimented licensing and inspection work of 
the BRH staff to the Audit Council. However, the entire scope of the 
licensing and inspection program was not evaluated and the General 
Accounting Office has published the criticisms cited above about the 
NRC evaluation process. In addition, the Audit Council has noted a 
significant increase in the numbers of licensees, inspections and growth 
in the volume of violations found as the number of inspections increases. 
(These are discussed in detail on pages 41 and 71.) The effect of staff 
shortage during the past two years is that currently there are 20 
inspections of licensees overdue. 
The State (BRH) is not receiving the benefit of having a compre-
hensive independent technical evaluation performed on the entire scope 
of its radioactive materials licensing and inspection program. The State 
receives no records of detailed deficiencies to use as benchmarks for 
future improvement. The Federal Government has provided no fiscal 
support for correcting potential deficiencies such as an overextended 
inspection staff. Because of the rapid growth in the numbers of licensees 
and the volume of nuclear activity in the State, the Audit Council 
believes that this combination of factors has the potential for unnecessarily 
exposing the public and nuclear industry employees to radioactive 
health and safety hazards. 
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The Audit Council firmly believes that a good inspection program 
can be an effective and economical measure for the prevention of radio-
active accidents/incidents. Therefore, the Audit Council concludes that 
the State should consider expanding support for the current inspection 
program. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION 
TO THE PUBLIC FROM THE HAZARDS OF RADIO-
ACTIVE MATERIALS USED BY LICENSEES WITHIN 
THE STATE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ENOUGH 
COMPETENT, WELL-TRAINED STAFF BE MAINTAINED 
WITHIN THE BUREAU OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 
(BRH) TO INSPECT LICENSEES WITHIN THE PRE-
SCRIBED TIME PERIODS ESTABLISHED IN THE 
NRC INSPECTION PRIORITY SCHEDULE. 
THE BRH SHOULD DEVELOP A SYSTEM FOR MAKING 
THREE-YEAR PROJECTIONS OF STAFF-DAY INSPEC-
TION NEEDS AND CORRESPONDING BUDGET REQUIRE-
MENTS SO AS TO ENSURE INASMUCH AS POSSIBLE 
THAT THE INSPECTION AND LICENSING PROGRAM 
DOES NOT SUFFER FROM INADEQUATE STAFFING 
DUE TO TURNOVER, ATTRITION, RECRUITING 
DELAYS, OR TRAINING DELAYS. 
-33-
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
REQUESTING THAT THE NRC PROVIDE WRITTEN 
COPIES OF ALL THEIR IN$PECTIONS OF STATE 
PROGRAMS TO THE STATE. 
BRH SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH RECIPRO-
CAL PROGRAMS WITH OTHER STATES (POSSIBLY 
THROUGH THE SOUTHERN STATES ENERGY BOARD -
SSEB) WHEREBY COMPREHENSIVE TECHNICAL 
EVALUATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL INSPEC-
TION AND LICENSING PROGRAMS ARE CONDUCTED 
BY QUALIFIED PERSONS FROM OTHER STATES 
UTILIZING COMMON STANDARDS. 
Discrepancies Found in Inspections of Radioactive Material Licensees 
1969-1979 
The Audit Council staff reviewed the State's procedures for licensing 
and inspection of handlers of radioactive materials. The BRH carries 
out this program. South Carolina entered an agreement with the U. S. 
Atomic Energy Commission (now NRC) in September 1969. The agreement 
authorized discontinuance of certain Federal regulatory authority and 
responsibility within the State pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The State assumed these regulatory 
tasks. However, the agreement requires that the State program be 
compatible with the NRC's program for the regulation of radioactive 
materials and be adequate to protect the public health and safety. 
Inspection criteria used by the BRH are based on guidelines set forth 
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by the NRC for different types of licenses. Checks for compliance with 
license conditions and State regulations promulgated by the Department 
of Health and Environmental Control must be compatible with NRC 
guidelines. Inspection criteria used by the BRH may differ from NRC 
rules provided they meet the minimum requirements of the NRC guide-
lines. For example I priority schedules established by the BRH for 
inspecting licensees call for more frequent inspections for academic I 
industrial and medical licensees than required by NRC guidelines. 
Appendix 3 is a copy of the licensing and inspection schedule. 
The Council reviewed the inspection records of a sample of 15 
license holders representing the four major categories of licenses (medi-
cal I academic I industrial and other) from 1969 to 1979. Some of the 
licensees examined did not have licenses until after 1969. In all I the 
records of 56 inspections of the 15 licensees were examined. 
Included in the sample were licensees of the following specific 
types: 3 academic licensees; 1 nuclear medicine I 1 pathology I and 1 
teletherapy licensee (medical); 1 gamma irradiator I 3 gauge or device I 
and 3 industrial radiography licensees (industrial); 1 nuclear laundry 
and 1 waste burial licensee (other). A review of the inspections con-
ducted by the BRH of these licensees from 1969 through 1979 indicated 
a total of 123 items of non-compliance with State regulations and license 
conditions. Types of items of non-compliance found included the following: 
Records not properly maintained (21 instances) 
Leaks tests not performed on devices , records not 
maintained (11) 
Areas not properly posted for radiation (10) 
Unauthorized radioactive material used I possessed 
(6) 
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Contamination smears, samples not performed ( 5) 
Transfer, receipt records inadequate ( 4) 
Excessive or inconsistent r~diation readings ( 4) 
Runoff water allowed in burial trench (4) 
Survey instruments not calibrated ( 4) 
Erosion over burial trenches ( 4) 
Inadequate emergency instructions or kits (3) 
Radiation exposure records incomplete (2) 
Unauthorized personnel install, transfer devices (2) 
Damaged monitoring wells near trench (2) 
Radioactive material packages ruptured during 
burial (2) 
Insufficient instructions to employees (2) 
Other (37) (include instances of non-compliance 
found only once) 
These items of non-compliance are violations of State regulations 
and license conditions required to maintain a radioactive material license. 
When items of non-compliance are found, the licensee is notified and 
required to respond to the BRH stating corrective actions to be taken. 
In cases where a potential radiological hazard exists, follow-up inspections 
are conducted after the licensee has been allowed adequate time to 
correct the violation. Other items of non-compliance are inspected at 
the next scheduled inspection to ensure that violations have been corrected. 
Table 2 summarizes the review of the sample of inspection records. 
Figure 1 is a plot showing the growth in the volume of discrepancies 
found in the inspections from 1969 to 1979. 
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Year 
1969 
1970 
I 1971 
V-1 
--1 
I 1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF DISCREPANCIES FOUND IN SAMPLE OF FIFTEEN 
BRH RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL LICENSEES' INSPECTIONS 
Total Total Number Number of 
Number of Number of Licenses Inspections 
Licenses of BRH in Each in LAC 
in State Inspections Year's Sample Sample 
129 10 3 1 
146 31 5 2 
168 26 7 4 
172 34 8 3 
179 56 10 5 
190 44 10 3 
202 65 11 4 
225 80 12 4 
258 108 13 7 
263 106 15 11 
282 74 15 12 
-
TOTAL 634 56 
-- l 
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Currently, the BRH has the authority to amend, suspend or revoke 
licenses or to impound radiation sources for failure to comply with the 
rules and regulations promulgated for radiation control. In addition, 
the South Carolina Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act and its 
amendments provide for persons who violate any rules or regulations for 
radiation control, negligently or otherwise, to be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor. Upon conviction such person may be punished by a fine 
of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars 
or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both fine and imprison-
ment for each separate violation. This penalty authority, however, is 
determinant upon conviction in a court of law. 
Because the State does not have civil authority to assess appropriate 
fines for negligent or willful violations of license conditions, the effective-
ness of the State's radioactive material licensing and inspection program 
as a deterrent to improper and potentially hazardous management of 
radioactive materials is severely undermined. 
As expected, as the volume of inspections increased, the number 
of items of. non-compliance also increased from 0 in 1969 to 41 in 1979. 
The State has only one Priority 1 licensee, the Chem-Nuclear radioactive 
waste burial facility. The Audit Council reviewed records of 13 BRH 
license inspections at Chem-Nuclear which accounted for 53 items of 
non-compliance. The 43 inspections reviewed among the other 14 licensees 
accounted for only 70 items of non-compliance. The cause for the 
increasing number of violations of State regulations and license conditions 
in part can be attributed ·to the annual growth in the number of licenses 
and the accompanying increase in the number of inspections. 
During its evaluation, the Audit Council staff made an unannounced 
visit to observe BRH activities at the Chem-Nuclear facility. Coincidentally, 
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the BRH staff on this date began their semi-annual inspection of Chem-
Nuclear which the Audit Council staff observed. 
The BRH inspection team had prepared check lists with specific 
areas to be reviewed relating to health, safety, training and compliance 
with the technical conditions of the facility's license. The team also 
reviewed areas which had been cited as problems in previous inspections. 
In our opinion the BRH inspection was thorough, objective, and conducted 
in a highly professional manner. Our review of the records of all 
previous BRH inspections (announced and unannounced) at Chem-Nuclear 
indicated that thoroughness and the insistence on full and prompt 
compliance were characteristic of all the inspections. 
Because of the potential hazards associated with the waste burial 
facility, BRH has maintained the inspection program at the facility as a 
major priority. A BRH inspector also is required at the site to inspect 
each waste shipment that arrives. This program is discussed on page 81. 
There has been a problem in the past due to a shortage of qualified 
staff to carry out the full scope of the radioactive materials licensing 
and inspection program statewide. 
There is a continuing problem although additional staff positions 
have been approved and filled at the BRH. It takes approximately one 
year of additional training, much of it at out-of-state schools, before a 
new staff member is adequately prepared to carry a full share of the 
BRH inspection workload. As cited previously, this makes it essential 
that BRH develop a system for projecting and documenting personnel 
needs based on projected workload over a three-year period in order to 
prevent lapses in the quality of inspections. 
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Because of the potential implications for public health and safety 
and based on the other findings and recommendations relating to the 
need for improved State oversight, monitoring, and control over radio-
active materials in the State, it may be necessary to further expand the 
staff at BRH. At least, emergency provisions should be established for 
replacing personnel in the event of sudden unforeseen position vacancies 
which could temporarily cripple the inspection program. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BRH SHOULD DEVELOP A SYSTEM FOR MAKING 
THREE-YEAR PROJECTIONS OF STAFF-DAY INSPEC-
TION NEEDS AND CORRESPONDING BUDGET REQUIRE-
MENTS SO AS TO ENSURE INASMUCH AS POSSIBLE 
THAT THE INSPECTION AND LICENSING PROGRAM 
DOES NOT SUFFER FROM INADEQUATE STAFFING 
DUE TO TURNOVER, ATTRITION, RECRUITING 
DELAYS, OR TRAINING DELAYS. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
ESTABLISHING EMERGENCY AUTHORITY FOR BRH 
TO CARRY ONE PERSON IN ADDITION TO THE 
APPROVED NUMBER OF POSITIONS WHEN IMPENDING 
POSITION VACANCIES IN THE INSPECTION STAFF 
BECOME KNOWN IN ORDER TO PREVENT CRITICAL 
DELAYS IN INSPECTIONS DUE TO THE TIME 
REQUIRED FOR TRAINING NEW PERSONNEL. BRH 
SHOULD ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT PERSONNEL WHO 
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POSSESS ENOUGH PROFESSIONAL SKILLS AND 
EXPERIENCE SO AS TO REDUCE THE ONE-YEAR 
OF TRAINING CURRENTLY; NECESSARY BEFORE 
NEW STAFF MEMBERS ARE FULLY QUALIFIED TO 
CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS. THE STATE PERSONNEL 
DIVISION SHOULD REVIEW CURRENT POSITION 
REQUIREMENTS FOR POSSIBLE UPGRADING. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
EXPANDING THE AUTHORITY OF DHEC/BRH TO 
INCLUDE LEVYING CIVIL PENAL TIES FOR VIOLA-
TIONS OF LICENSE CONDITIONS WHICH POSE 
SIGNIFICANT THREATS TO EMPLOYEE AND/OR 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. THE EXPANDED 
AUTHORITY AT A MINIMUM SHOULD INCLUDE 
AUTHORITY TO LEVY FINES IN AMOUNTS RANGING 
FROM $100 PER DAY TO $10,000 PER DAY DEPENDING 
ON SEVERITY OF HAZARD. 
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SECTION TWO 
SUMMARY OF THE TYPES OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR RELATED 
HAZARDS AND THE STATE'S PREPAREDNESS FOR EACH 
Introduction 
The discussion of potential nuclear hazards in South Carolina does 
not include the dangers resulting from a nuclear attack. However, 
much of the State's peace-time nuclear emergency response capability is 
derived from the training, equipment and funds that have been made 
available for civil preparedness in the event of a nuclear war. In 
addition, the discussion refers generally to threats to the safety of the 
"unsuspecting" public. That is, persons who are not aware that they 
are in the immediate proximity of potentially hazardous .radioactive 
materials or who are not specifically trained to recognize and deal with 
radioactive materials and hazards. 
The types of potential nuclear hazards have been divided into five 
general categories: (1) transportation, (2) nuclear power plant operation, 
(3) radioactive waste storage and reprocessing, ( 4) nuclear materials 
fabrication, and (5) other radiation hazards. Discussions of the various 
types of hazards within each general category, the preventative measures 
and the State's response capabilities for each general category are 
presented in this section. Figure 2 is a simplified diagram of the 
nuclear industry which allows comparison with the five categories of 
nuclear hazards. 
There are two important points to be remembered in reviewing the 
State's current level of emergency preparedness and developing steps 
for improvement. First, nuclear emergency preparedness should be 
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considered as a component of the State's plans for overall emergency 
preparedness. Second, steps being considered for improving nuclear 
emergency preparedness should ack:npwledge the following conditions: 
(1) Federal nuclear safety requirements and nuclear emergency response 
capability requirements are currently undergoing major revisions, (2) 
the State requirements 1 plans and level of preparedness for nuclear 
emergencies are undergoing major revisions as a result of the work of 
the Governor's Task Force, (3) the United States General Accounting 
Office has published within the last year, many well-documented criti-
cisms of weaknesses in Federal support and guidance in relation to 
nuclear emergency preparedness which the State must consider in 
developing its own emergency response capability, and ( 4) ~th the 
publication of this report the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy will 
have at its disposal the work of the Task Force, the Audit Council, the 
Committee staff's research and the testimony from public hearings to 
prepare further recommendations for improvement. 
POTENTIAL HAZARDS RELATED TO TRANSPORTATION OF 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AND THE STATE'S EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1978 estimated that over two 
million packages of radioactive materials are shipped within the United 
States annually. Further I they estimated that the volume of shipments 
would increase to 5. 5 million annually by 1985. There are several 
thousand shipments involving some amount of radioactive material into, 
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out of 1 or through South Carolina each year. There are no comprehen-
sive statistics centrally maintained on the total volume of radioactive 
materials shipped within the State. 
Radioactive materials are moved in the State by air I rail I highway 
carrier I and by sea if the Charleston port facilities are included. 
There are four types of potential sources of radioactive hazard related 
to transport of these materials. First I the carrier may be involved in 
an accident or sabotage in which the container could be damaged suffi-
ciently to allow a release of the radioactive materials. The second 
potential source of radiation hazard is from insufficient packaging of the 
material. For example I a container may be too small. If so I there may 
not be enough distance between the radioactive source material and 
container walls to reduce the radioactivity level at the outside surface 
of the wall to a level within the safe exposure limits established by the 
NRC. 
Improper packaging is a third potential hazard source. For example I 
an abrupt shift in load or rough handling I may cause a vial containing 
a radiopharmaceutical to break and leak its contents into its container 
package if it is not properly padded and secured within the container. 
Finally 1 improper handling of the package or its contents during loading 
or unloading operations may result in unnecessary exposure or spillage. 
Measures to prevent unintentional exposures to or releases of 
radioactive material during transportation center around (1) proper 
training, (2) appropriate security measures I (3) effective inspection 
programs I and ( 4) establishing pre-planned routes and enroute obser-
vation procedures when and where appropriate. If an accident/incident 
occurs in spite of these measures I the level of hazard can be reduced 
by having an effective emergency response capability. 
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Based on the Audit Council's review in South Carolina and our 
review of similar evaluations conducted in other states, there are improve-
ments that can be made in each of the areas of prevention relating to 
transportation of radioactive materials. These are discussed below. 
Training 
Highway carriers account for the majority of shipments of radio-
active material. However, there are no uniform Federal or South Carolina 
laws or regulations requiring that drivers of all vehicles hauling radio-
active material have any special training or preparation for dealing with 
radioactive hazards in the event they are involved in a nuclear accident/ 
incident. There are no Federal or State minimum standards requiring 
that drivers carry and know how to operate and interpret radiation 
detection instruments. Similarly, there are no uniform standards for 
wearing personal dosimeters or film badges to record their personal 
cumulative exposure if they do encounter radiation. 
In addition, in a May 1979 report, the General Accounting Office 
critically pointed out that "there are no Federal regulations requiring 
shippers of nuclear materials to have emergency response plans. " 
Further, although Department of Transportation regulations require 
carriers to instruct drivers on appropriate actions to be taken in event 
of an accident, there are no uniform standards as to the type and 
depth of instruction. Nor are there standardized training requirements 
for actions to be taken if the accident involves radioactive materials. 
For example, some carriers do provide detailed instruction for drivers 
including how to obtain a radiation reading, roping off the immediate 
accident area, and how to notify proper authorities. 
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Numerous State, Federal and nuclear industry officials pointed out 
that frequently drivers are totally uninformed as to the nature and 
potential hazards of their radioactive cargo. For these drivers, their 
primary concern is that they are in compliance with applicable DOT 
regulations, such as displaying the proper placard for the type of 
hazard. Although a driver may be fined for this type of violation, it is 
actually the shipper's responsibility to ensure that the load is properly 
placarded at the shipping point. 
If a driver of radioactive shipments is adequately trained and is 
not injured in an accident, as the first on the scene the driver is in a 
position to take immediate steps to minimize his own and the public's 
potential for exposure to a radiation hazard. 
In the absence of adequate driver training if an accident occurs, 
exposure to a potential radioactive hazard to the driver and the public 
may be unnecessarily prolonged until properly (nuclear) trained person-
nel arrive at the site. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
ESTABLISHING THROUGH THE BUREAU OF RADIO-
LOGICAL HEALTH THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS 
FOR DRIVERS LICENSED IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
WHO HAUL RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN LARGE 
QUANTITIES. 
(1) MINIMUM STANDARDS OF DRIVER FAMILIARITY 
WITH RADIATION HAZARDS AND SAFETY. 
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(2) STANDARDS FOR IMMEDIATE PROTECTIVE 
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AT THE SITE BY 
DRIVERS WHEN ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 
INVOLVE RADIOACTIVE CARGOES. 
(3) STANDARDS FOR A MODEL TRAINING PRO-
GRAM (WITH PERIODIC REFRESHER TRAINING) 
TO BE GIVEN TO DRIVERS BY SHIPPING 
COMPANIES TO USE IN CONDUCTING THEIR 
OWN DRIVER TRAINING FOR NUCLEAR EMER-
GENCIES. BRH WOULD MONITOR AND INSPECT 
SUCH COMPANY TRAINING PROGRAMS AND 
AUTHORIZE CERTIFICATES TO BE ISSUED TO 
EACH DRIVER SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING 
THE TRAINING. 
( 4) BRH SHOULD EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES 
OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR THE STATE TO 
ESTABLISH A MODEL DRIVER TRAINING 
PROGRAM. THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING 
THE PROGRAM AVAILABLE NATIONALLY 
SHOULD ALSO BE EXPLORED. THIS MAY 
ALLOW SUCH A PROGRAM TO BE FISCALLY 
SELF-SUPPORTING AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTING 
ASSISTANCE IN SOLVING A NATIONAL PROBLEM. 
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Security 
There are two types of security involving transportation of radio-
active materials. First are physical security measures intended to 
protect or insulate the materials from access by unauthorized persons. 
This type of security generally involves protection from sabotage, 
terrorist acts, theft, or malicious damage. Critical defense related 
materials, such as· plutonium, which also have high radiation toxicity, 
are transported with maximum security. For example, plutonium is 
shipped in relatively small amounts in unmarked vehicles which are 
constantly tracked from three sources. The vehicle drivers are armed 
and are specially trained in security and radiation protection measures. 
The shipments are escorted by armed officials with Federal Marshal 
police authority. 
The second type of security focuses on protecting the public from 
an unforeseen and unplanned radiation exposure which may result from 
an accident/incident during shipment. For example, if radioactive 
materials w~re spilled at an accident, or a sabotage incident, an immediate 
objective would be to contain or isolate the material from the public. 
Other immediate objectives would be to recapture the spilled material 
and place it in a suitable container, and apply appropriate decontamination 
measures if necessary. 
The Federal Government has primary responsibility for the safe 
transportation of nuclear materials. In a study published in May 1979, 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that "Federal agencies 
responsible for the safe transportation of nuclear materials have not de-
veloped and enforced policies and regulations which adequately protect 
the public from exposure to radiation from such shipments." Appendix 4 
is a photocopy of the summary of the GAO report. 
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South Carolina was not one of the states visited by GAO auditors, 
nevertheless, the State is affected by the problems at the Federal level 
cited by GAO. These problems are I;Dentioned here to emphasize that 
the State must look beyond mere compliance with Federal guidelines in 
the area of nuclear transportation in order to ensure that reasonable 
safeguards for public health and safety are maintained. For example, 
GAO found that DOT and NRC nanow levels of radioactive contamination 
on packages and transport vehicles which are unnecessarily high. This 
unnecessary radiation creates a potential hazard for transportation 
workers as well as the general public. 11 
More specifically related to security from sabotage, the GAO found 
that current Federal regulations for protecting weapons-grade nuclear 
materials shipped in quantities large enough to be considered of stra-
tegic value were inadequate and needed upgrading. GAO also found 
that similar problems and potential hazards from sabotage relating to 
spent-fuel shipments existed. 
Currently the Federal Government is in the process of reviewing 
and revising security standards for the various categories of radioactive 
materials and the varying levels of hazard of each category. In late 
1979 the NRC published upgraded requirements for physical security at 
nuclear power plants. 
South Carolina does not have a comprehensive program relating to 
security of radioactive materials being transported within the State. 
The State does not have a policy establishing minimum physical security 
standards at fixed nuclear facilities. The State has no jurisdiction over 
fixed nuclear facilities due to preemption by Federal Regulation (lOCFRSO). 
Nor does the State have a program for inspecting physical security 
during transportation or at nuclear facilities. 
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The Audit Council believes that physical security measures for 
low-level radioactive material need not be as strict as they are for 
high-level material because the potential hazard to the public is much 
less from low-level materials. Physical security of nuclear facilities and 
for nuclear materials during shipment may not be an appropriate area 
for State regulatory involvement especially in light of the new Federal 
initiatives regarding physical security. However I in the current circum-
stances the State has no comprehensive plan for coordination between 
nuclear facilities and State and/or local law enforcement personnel and 
nuclear emergency response personnel in the planning for physical 
security. Neither does the State have a formal comprehensive method 
for being advised as to the adequacy of physical security plans and 
procedures at facilities or during transportation. In addition I in light 
of the inadequacies in emergency training for drivers hauling radioactive 
material, cited previously, there is a weakness in securing the public 
from possible radiation exposure at an accident/incident site. 
The effect of these conditions is that the State has limited informa-
tion and guidance as to what physical security standards should be for 
different types of radioactive material. The State also has no systematic 
way of being informed if security measures during transportation and at 
nuclear facilities are adequate or inadequate. In addition, the lack of 
coordination and planning with the Federal Government means that the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the State's ability to provide emergency 
assistance if requested would be hampered. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD REQUEST THE 
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE TO EXAMINE THE 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS RELATING TO PHYSICAL 
SECURITY AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND DURING 
TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND 
REPORT ON WHAT PRECAUTIONS AND LEVEL OF 
INVOLVEMENT THE STATE MAY WISH TO IMPLE-
MENT IN THIS AREA. 
Transportation Inspections of Radioactive Shipments 
The State through DHEC has a contract jointly with DOT and the 
NRC "to provide inspections and surveillance of radioactive material in 
transport within the State. " 
DHEC has issued two reports based on the two contracts completed 
since 1976. A third contract is nearing completion with a report expected 
in the Fall of 1980. Below is a summary of the contract requirements 
taken from the report published in April 1978. Appendix 5 contains a 
photocopy of the inspection methodology and a summary of the findings 
from the 1978 report. 
Scope of Contract Requirements ....... . 
1. The State would visit selected carrier facilities 
at least quarterly during the period of the 
contract. 
2. Perform radiation surveys to determine radiation 
levels at each work station in terminals or 
warehouses. Post area monitoring devices at 
selected terminals and document radiation 
exposure levels. 
3. Perform contamination surveys at each work 
station and on radioactive material packages 
and transport vehicles. 
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4. Badge individual employees to determine person-
nel exposure. 
5. Perform package inspections to include radiation 
levels, labeling, marking, contamination, and 
shipping documents. 
6. Perform inspection on transport vehicles to 
document radiation levels, contamination, 
placarding, transport index, and shipping 
documents. 
The inspections involved two air-freight terminals and six highway 
carrier terminals. One of the highway carrier terminals was the com-
bination transportation facility and low-level radioactive waste burial 
facility outside of Barnwell, South Carolina. According to the staff of 
BRH no inspections ever have been made by State officials of radioactive 
materials shipped by rail. Most rail shipments of radioactive materials 
within South Carolina are under Federal Control since they are to or 
from the Savannah River Plant or are enroute to another Federal facility. 
The sample of inspections conducted under the contract with the 
NRC and DOT are performed after shipments are in the State and at or 
near their final destination. In addition, all shipments of low-level 
radioactive waste to the Chem-Nuclear waste burial facility currently are 
inspected by BRH at the Chem-Nuclear facility prior to their acceptance 
for burial. 
The Audit Council interviewed officials from the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to determine if this agency's vehicle inspection pro-
gram included special provisions for shipments carrying radioactive 
material. PSC does not inspect for violations of radiation safety regu-
lations specifically. Their· inspectors look primarily for compliance with 
DOT regulations which relate to overall vehicle safety, mechanical 
condition, vehicle licensing, and other non-nuclear related criteria. 
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However, when a vehicle carrying radioactive material receives an 
inspection, the radioactive load placards on the vehicle are compared 
with the manifest accompanying the. shipment. The type of placard 
displayed must agree with the level of radioactive hazard of the material 
cited in the manifest. 
The PSC inspectors do not have training nor instruments to inspect 
the actual level of radiation in a shipment. In addition, PSC only has 
authority to inspect "For-Hire" carriers which operate only 1. 5% of all 
trucks registered in South Carolina. In the beginning of 1978 there 
were 5,560 "For-Hire" vehicles in the State. Private carrier firms and 
their trucks (approximately 13,750 firms in 1978) are exempt from PSC 
inspection by State law. 
PSC has no special inspection program oriented toward shipments 
of radioactive materials. They have never, for example, stationed an 
inspector at the Chem-Nuclear radioactive waste burial facility to look 
for the types of DOT violations that come under their jurisdiction. 
(The carrier inspection program at Chern-Nuclear is discussed in more 
detail on page 81. ) 
When a carrier with a radioactive shipment is cited by PSC for a 
violation of DOT regulations, BRH does not receive a copy of the citation. 
This means that the State is not realizing the full potential of its inspec-
tion program to identify carriers and/or shippers of radioactive material 
who may have a history of DOT violations. 
The effectiveness of the PSC inspection and their enforcement 
authority is hampered by the $100 limit on the amount of fine that may 
be charged to a carrier found to be in violation. This limit has not 
been changed in approximately thirty years according to PSC officials, 
and is ineffective as a deterrent. 
The PSC inspectors also may be an under-utilized nuclear emergency 
resource since they have no specific role in the State's peace-time 
radiological disaster preparedness plan. For example 1 the uniformed 
enforcement officers could be used to assist in evacuation warning and 
traffic control. 
From review of the State's inspection activities and from discussions 
with PSC officials and BRH officials I the Audit Council concluded that 
PSC's inspection program could be easily expanded so as to improve the 
State's monitoring and inspection of shipments of radioactive material. 
One or more of several possible actions could be taken which would 
expand the scope and improve the effectiveness of the inspection of 
radioactive shipments. 
RECOMMENDED OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TRANSPORTATION INSPECTIONS 
(1) INCREASE THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF FINE 
WHICH CAN BE LEVIED BY PSC INSPECTORS 
AGAINST MOTOR VEHICLE CARRIERS FOUND 
TO BE IN VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE STATE 
AND/OR FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS. 
EXTRA PENAL TIES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED 
FOR VIOLATIONS BY CARRIERS OF HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS WHERE SUCH VIOLATIONS PRESENT 
SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL HAZARD TO THE 
HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. 
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(2) WHEN CARRIERS HAULING RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS ARE CITED FOR A VIOLATION BY 
PSC INSPECTORS 1 A. COPY OF THE CITATION 
SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO BRH. BRH WILL 
PERIODICALLY COMPARE THESE CITATIONS 
WITH THEIR OWN INSPECTION FILES TO 
IDENTIFY CARRIERS AND/OR SHIPPERS WHO 
ARE REPEAT OFFENDERS FOR POSSIBLE 
CORRECTIVE ACTION. 
(3) THE INSPECTION PROGRAM AT PSC COULD 
BE EXPANDED SO AS TO INCLUDE A LARGER 
NUMBER OF CARRIERS HAULING RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL. THIS MAY INVOLVE EXPANSION 
OF THEIR CURRENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
(4) WITH TRAINING FROM BRH STAFF 1 PSC 
INSPECTORS COULD USE RADIATION DETEC-
TION INSTRUMENTS TO PERFORM SIMPLE 
TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RADIA-
TION LEVEL OF A SHIPMENT IS WITHIN 
PRESCRIBED LIMITS 1 IN ADDITION TO THEIR 
CHECKS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH DOT REGULA-
TIONS. THIS TRAINING COULD BE PROVIDED 
TO EACH PSC INSPECTION OFFICER WHO IS 
ASSIGNED FOR ONE DAY TO CONDUCT INSPEC-
TIONS AT THE CHEM-NUCLEAR WASTE BURIAL 
FACILITY. 
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(5) PSC INSPECTORS SHOULD HAVE A DESIGNATED 
ROLE IN THE STATE'S PEACE-TIME RADIOLOG-
ICAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN. THE 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DIVISION IN 
REVISING THE PLAN SHOULD CONSIDER 
USING THE PSC INSPECTORS TO ASSIST IN 
THE AREAS OF EVACUATION WARNING 
AND/OR EVACUATION TRAFFIC CONTROL. 
(6) CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM OF INSPECTIONS 
OF SELECTED RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENTS INTO 
THE STATE AT OR NEAR THE BORDER. PSC 
INSPECTORS COULD BE PROVIDED THE 
PROPER INSTRUMENTS AND SIMPLE TRAINING 
TO MEASURE WHETHER SHIPMENTS ARE 
WITHIN EXTERNAL RADIATION LIMITS PRE-
SCRIBED BY THE DOT. IN THE EVENT 
EXCESSIVE RADIATION WAS FOUND, BRH 
WOULD BE NOTIFIED AND A BRH TEAM 
WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. 
Pre-Planned Routes and Enroute Observation 
The NRC and Department of Defense employ techniques of armed 
escorts, pre-planned routes, predesignated radio check-points, and 
constant surveillance for shipments of radioactive materials which are 
considered of strategic value. In spite of these safeguards the General 
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Accounting Office in their May 1979 report cited several inadequacies in 
these provisions. Some of these were cited previously in the section on 
security. Appendix 4 contains a s~ary of GAO comments. 
In addition, GAO cited the vulnerability of spent-fuel shipments to 
sabotage and the subsequent potential hazards to the public. Their 
summary comments on this topic appear in Appendix 6. 
South Carolina does not have a comprehensive policy for pre-planning 
transportation routes of hazardous materials to minimize the public's 
exposure to a potential major hazard from radioactive or other dangerous 
materials. Nor does the State have an established policy of coordination 
with Federal agencies in route selection nor in surveillance assistance 
for hazardous shipments. 
The BRH requires Chern-Nuclear in its radioactive material license 
to provide to BRH prior notification of all low-level radioactive waste 
shipments which are to be received for burial at the Barnwell site. 
The BRH on-site inspector, five to ten days prior to arrival of each 
shipment, receives a copy of the notification form from the shipper. 
These records are maintained at the Chem-Nuclear site by BRH. They 
contain the arrival date, routes used, description of the material, cubic 
footage, shipper I and other information. 
BRH is also notified in advance of spent-fuel shipments to the 
Savannah River Plant by telephone from the NRC. However I it is not 
known whether BRH is notified of all spent-fuel being shipped in the 
State. BRH has no authority to require prior notification of spent-fuel 
shipments. 
The notifications that are provided by the NRC are kept in a log 
book at BRH and no other action is taken and no other State agencies 
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are notified of the shipment. The data recorded includes the port of 
entry into the country, shipment origination point and shipper name, 
amount of material shipped, and arrival dates. No specific information 
is received regarding the route of travel. 
An informal notification arrangement has been established between 
the Carolina Power and Light Company and the local District Office of 
the State Highway Patrol. The NRC and the Patrol Office receive prior 
notification when spent-fuel rods are to be moved from the H. B. Robinson 
Nuclear Power Plant to a storage facility in North Carolina. These 
shipments are made by rail. Although Highway Patrol officers monitor 
the progress of the shipment, no other agency, including BRH, is 
notified. In addition I the Audit Council could find no provisions for 
coordination among local government agencies in regard to notification 
or surveillance of high-level (spent-fuel) radioactive shipments. 
The Audit Council examined the BRH log of notifications of radio-
active material shipments for the period June 2 I 1977 to March 4, 1980. 
Of the total of 79 shipments, 63 were shipments of spent-fuel called in 
by NRC I and 4 were shipments of spent-fuel from the Robinson plant to 
North Carolina called in by Carolina Power and Light. The remaining 
12 shipments involved low-level waste being transported to the Chem-
Nuclear burial site. Notifications of these shipments were received from 
a variety of different sources including Chern-Nuclear and the South 
Carolina Disaster Preparedness Agency. 
The GAO I the SCDHPT I the Office of Emergency Preparedness, 
the Governor's Task Force·, the BRH, and the Audit Council agree that 
the threat to the public safety is reduced when shipments of hazardous 
materials are routed around densely populated areas. In addition, 
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there is general consensus that well-coordinated prior notification of a 
hazardous material shipment and its route, improves the emergency 
response capability. This information also can improve plans for physi-
cal security for the shipment. 
Not all shipments of radioactive materials present a major threat to 
the public even in the hypothetical "worst possible 11 types of accidents/ 
incidents. There is, however, potential for a major threat to public 
safety from the "worst possible" accident/incident involving a shipment 
of high-level radioactive waste or strategic nuclear materials. Based on 
the Federal Government's own studies the State must at least be skeptical 
about the adequacy of Federal safeguards for public safety in the 
transport of large volumes of highly toxic radioactive materials. The 
State has been deficient in providing better safeguards because it has 
not established a comprehensive statewide policy which coordinates its 
existing resources to provide route planning, prior notification of 
central emergency response authorities, or enroute surveillance assistance. 
Neither has the State identified specifically, the types and levels of 
hazardous materials which should receive all or some of these considerations. 
The absence of this type of preparedness can hamper the State's 
ability to respond as efficiently and as effectively as possible in the 
event of an accident/incident involving radioactive materials. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD IMPLEMENT A 
COMPREHENSIVE STATEWIDE POLICY REQUIRING: 
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(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR PRIOR 
NOTIFICATION TO A CENTRAL STATE OFFICE 
OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS 
PRESENTING SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL HAZARD 
TO PUBLIC SAFETY, 
(2) PRE-PLANNING OF TRANSPORT ROUTES FOR 
THE ABOVE SHIPMENTS, 
(3) PRIOR COORDINATION OF SURVEILLANCE 
ASSISTANCE FOR THE SHIPMENTS CITED 
ABOVE, AND 
(4) ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIFIC HAZARD CRI-
TERIA TO DETERMINE WHAT LEVELS OF 
SECURITY, ROUTE LIMITATIONS, AND SUR-
VEILLANCE ARE APPROPRIATE FOR DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF HAZARDOUS SHIPMENTS. 
IN ADDITION, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD 
EXERCISE VIGOROUS INITIATIVES TO ENCOURAGE 
IMPROVED FEDERAL SUPPORT AND COORDINATION 
RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION SAFETY, SECURITY, 
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL BEING SHIPPED BY ANY MEANS IN 
SOUTH CAROLINA. 
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POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAZARDS AND 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 
There is a massive amount of technical research published on the 
potential radioactive hazards associated with nuclear power plants. 
There is consensus among scientists, nuclear industry personnel, govern-
ment officials and the public that the potential for real danger to public 
health and safety from an accident/incident at a nuclear power plant 
does exist. 
There are significant controversies in the scientific community and 
in the public regarding the likelihood of a major accident or incident 
occurring which would be a significant threat to public health and 
safety. There is also considerable controversy among scientists regarding 
the scope and duration of the hazardous effects of a major accident/inci-
dent involving a nuclear power plant. 
The Audit Council has not attempted to analyze the statistical 
probabilities of the occurrence of a major nuclear accident/incident. 
Our focus has been merely to identify the types of potential hazards to 
public health and safety associated with the operation of a nuclear 
power plant. We also attempt to point out the areas where there is 
controversy about the danger of health hazard. 
Figure 2 is a simplified diagram of a nuclear power plant. The 
basic principles of its operation are similar to coal powered electric 
generating plants. The nuclear fission activity that takes place inside 
the reactor vessel produces tremendous amounts of heat. The heat is 
used to produce the steam necessary for turning the turbines that 
produce electricity. 
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Borated water is used as a coolant for the fission reaction by 
being circulated in a closed system around the nuclear fuel core. The 
most hazardous situation that can occur is for the fission reaction to 
burn out of control due to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or some 
other major failure in the control systems. Even under the worst 
accident conditions there is no possibility for a nuclear explosion to 
occur in a nuclear power plant which would be similar to the detonation 
of a nuclear bomb. 
The hazards are from the possible release of an excessive amount 
of radioactive material from the plant. The release could be in the form 
of gas vented to the atmosphere or radioactive liquid could be released 
from the plant into the environment. 
To date, no nuclear power plants in the United States have experi-
enced an accident/incident which involved the release of radioactive 
material off the plant site in large enough quantity to be considered an 
immediate danger to public health. 
The accident at the Three-Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant near 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in March 1979 has been described as the 
"worst" accident in the history of the nuclear power industry. The 
nuclear fuel core became partially uncovered due to a LOCA which 
resulted in a partial melting of the core. Subsequent analyses of the 
accident concluded that plant operators failed to correctly identify the 
specific nature of the accident until two days after it began. Because 
of this delay, a total melt-down of the nuclear fuel core came within 45 
to 60 minutes of completion. 
During the six days after the beginning of the accident both 
planned and unplanned releases of radioactive material occurred. The 
average radiation dose from March 28 to April 15, 1979 to a person 
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living within five miles of the plant was calculated to be approximately 
ten percent of annual background radiation and was probably less. 
There is a significant and hazardous amount of radiation in the buildings 
housing the reactors and its supporting equipment which is awaiting 
clean-up. This radiation poses a potential health hazard primarily to 
the personnel who will be involved in the clean-up operation. 
There appears to be an even division among the scientific community 
regarding the threat to the public if a total core melt-down had occurred 
at the Three-Mile Island Plant. Some feel that a melt-down would 
necessarily cause a breech in the reactor vessel and containment structure 
by melting through the bottom and into the ground which would then 
cause a release of large amounts of radiation to the atmosphere. Others 
feel that the combination of the reactor vessel I the floor of the containment 
structure I and the solid rock under the structure are more than adequate 
to contain the radiation in the highly unlikely event of a melt-down 
penetrating the reactor vessel. The controversy regarding the conse-
quences of a nuclear fuel core melt-down is one of longstanding. 
The majority of research into the health effects of radiation has 
been in the area of high dose rates I primarily in assessing the effective-
ness of atomic weapons. Less research has been conducted into the 
health consequences of low-level radiation. The Report of the President's 
Commission on the Accident at Three-Mile Island 1 commented that "The 
health effects of radiation dose levels of a few rems or less are not 
known." 
One of the dangerous elements produced in large quantity during 
the accident was Iodine 131 cr131). Only trace amounts were found to 
have been released to the outside which were in too small a quantity to 
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pose a threat to the local population. r131 has a radioactive half-life of 
ten days and after this period it decays to a non-hazardous element. · 
As an emergency preparedness measure, a crash effort was initiated 
to obtain substantial supplies of potassium iodide. Two hundred fifty 
thousand (250 ,000) bottles were delivered to Pennsylvania for possible 
emergency distribution to plant workers and the local population within 
two days after the decision was made. Potassium iodide can effectively 
block the absorption of r131 by the thyroid gland. 
The blocking agent was not distributed to the local populace nor to 
any of the emergency workers at the plant site. Appendix 7 is a 
summary of the events and decisions relating to the potassium iodide. 
The relevance of this event for South Carolina is that when the 
decision was made to obtain the iodide it was still not known that a 
partial melt-down had occurred. The potential for release of r131 was 
remote but nevertheless, underestimated because of the failure to accu-
rately diagnose that a major accident was in progress. In retrospect, 
the decision not to distribute the iodide, even to plant emergency 
workers, might have been the same even with more accurate information. 
The accident began on a Wednesday morning and the extensive 
core damage was not verified until Friday. That a melt-down had been 
in progress was not recognized until that point. The decision to order 
the iodide was made on Friday with first shipments arriving the following 
Sunday. The iodide was not available at all until five days after the 
accident began. For maximum effectiveness the iodide must be taken 
prior to ingestion of r131 . It will have some blocking effect if taken no 
more than three hours after ingestion of r131 . 
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South Carolina has no supplies of potassium iodide for distribution 
to emergency personnel or to the population in the vicinity of a nuclear 
facility. According to officials at the BRH, some supplies are maintained 
in Atlanta by the Food and Drug Administration for their Emergency 
Radiological Assistance Team (ERAT), but the State has no formal 
agreement as to when and how the supplies would be obtained if needed 
in an emergency. There are no provisions for emergency distribution 
of potassium iodide in the State's peace-time radiological emergency 
preparedness plan. There are no State provisions for distribution 
authority, liability, or distribution procedures. 
In the absence of a readily available emergency supply of potassium 
iodide, emergency personnel who may encounter I131 could be unnecessar-
ily exposed to a dangerous radiation dosage. Emergency operations may 
be delayed unnecessarily in the presence of I131 without a readily 
accessible emergency supply of potassium iodide. 
By contrast, in the United Kingdom, there is more focus on preparing 
the local populace for radiation emergencies around nuclear power 
plants. There are heavy controls on land use. Evacuation plans and 
iodine pills are widely distributed. 
The Audit Council concurs with the recommendations of the BRH 
staff that a small emergency supply of potassium iodide be maintained 
by the State. 
Three major assessments of the Three-Mile Island accident were 
completed recently. One study was ordered by the President. The 
NRC commissioned a private firm for the second study, and the third 
study was conducted by a Commission established by the Governor of 
Pennsylvania. Each of the studies concluded that the major health 
effect of the accident "appears to have been on the mental health of the 
people living in the region ... " 
-67-
The following comment from the Governor's Commission summarizes 
the conclusions of the President's Commission. 
The TMI accident had a pronounced demoralizing 
effect on the general population of the TMI area ... 
However, this effect proved transient in all groups 
studied except the workers, who continue to show 
relatively high levels of demoralization. Moreover, 
the groups in the general population and the workers, 
in their different ways, have continuing problems of 
trust that stem directly from the accident. 
The summary of health effect findings in the report of the Presi-
dent's Commission included the following conclusions on the psychologi-
cal stress. 
The major health effect of the accident appears to 
have been on the mental health of the people living 
in the region of Three-Mile Island and of the workers 
at TMI. There was immediate, short-lived mental 
distress produced by the accident among certain 
groups of the general population living within 20 
miles of TMI. The highest levels of distress were 
found among adults a) living within 5 miles of TMI, 
or b) with preschool children; and among teenagers 
a) living within 5 miles of TMI, b) with preschool 
siblings , or c) whose families left the area. War kers 
at TMI experienced more distress than workers at 
another plant studied for comparison purposes. 
This distress was higher among the nonsupervisory 
employees and continued in the months following the 
accident. 
Several studies are currently underway to provide better detail on 
the effects of the accident's psychological stress to the population 
surrounding the Three-Mile Island facility. 
Much of the mental stress initially has been attributed to the 
widely conflicting and contradictory information provided to the public 
during the days of the accident. Due to a lack of candor, a lack of 
coordination, and the issuance of misleading information, public informa-
tion officials soon lost credibility with the news media and the public. 
For example, within hours after the accident was declared "over" by 
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one official source, another official source initiated the evacuation of 
persons most susceptible to radiation injury within a five-mile radius of 
the plant. 
South Carolina has no guidelines in its current medical provisions 
for radiological emergencies to provide initial emergency psychological 
treatment or counseling for mental stress incurred in the event of a 
major radiological accident/incident. However I the State Comprehensive 
Disaster Preparedness Plan, in Annex C-8 1 designates responsibility to 
the Department of Mental Health for providing psychological counseling 
assistance. 
In addition to the potential hazards associated with an operating 
nuclear power plant, there are also hazards associated with inactive or 
decommissioned plants. The maximum operational life-span of a nuclear 
power plant is approximately thirty years. When the plant is retired it 
will be shut down and the nuclear fuel will be removed from the reactor 
core. The inside of the reactor vessel and certain auxiliary components 
will remain as a radiation hazard which must be secured from public 
access for an indefinite period if it is not completely removed. 
There is a growing nationwide controversy about the issue of 
nuclear power plant decommissioning. The Federal Government has not 
yet established firm guidelines for methods of decommissioning I safety 
standards, security standards I nor funding mechanisms. Also, it has 
not been established which agencies (Federal, State or others) will bear 
responsibility for the decommissioned plants. 
South Carolina currently has no comprehensive policy which addresses 
the issues and problems associated with decommissioning of nuclear 
power plants. An official of the State Public Service Commission stated 
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that the Commission has begun to review requirements for decommis-
sioning, focusing on rate increases that may be needed for funding. 
The State has one private nuc~ear plant which is "mothballed" or 
not fully decommissioned. It is the small experimental plant owned by 
the Carolinas-Virginia Nuclear Power Association which began operation 
in 1963 and began decommissioning in 1967. The plant is located near 
Parr, South Carolina on land owned by South Carolina Electric and Gas 
Company. The plant is fenced and locked and is posted to ward off 
trespassers. The BRH maintains a license on the plant and radiation 
monitoring equipment is located on the site's boundaries. The utility 
companies in the Association have sole responsibility for the plant. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD REQUIRE THAT 
BRH ESTABLISH AN EMERGENCY SUPPLY OF 
POTASSIUM IODIDE AND FORMALIZE THE CRITERIA 
AND PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AND ADMINIS-
TERING ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES SHOULD LARGE 
SCALE EMERGENCY POPULATION PROTECTION 
FROM I131 BECOME NECESSARY. 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA PEACE-TIME RADIOLOGICAL 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN SHOULD INCLUDE 
PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY PSYCHOLOGICAL 
TREATMENT AND/OR COUNSELING IN THE EVENT 
OF A MAJOR ACCIDENT/INCIDENT AT A FIXED 
NUCLEAR FACILITY. 
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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
ESTABLISHING AND FUNDING SPECIAL EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS FOR PERSONS LIVING WITHIN A TEN-
MILE RADIUS OF FIXED NUCLEAR F AGILITIES 
WHICH WOULD FAMILIARIZE PERSONS WITH RADIA-
TION HAZARDS, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR THE VICINITY, 
AND INDIVIDUAL RESIDENTS' RESPONSIBILITIES. 
THESE CITIZENS SHOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED FOR 
THEM A CENTRAL INFORMATION SOURCE (SUCH 
AS BRH OR THE UTILITY) WHICH THEY CAN 
CONTACT AT ANY TIME THEY HAVE A QUESTION 
PERTAINING TO RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH OR 
SAFETY. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE BRH 
SHOULD DEVELOP JOINTLY A POLICY PROPOSAL 
FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER IN 
DEVELOPING A STATE POSITION REGARDING 
DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. 
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POTENTIAL RADIOACTIVE HAZARDS FROM NUCLEAR FUEL 
REPROCESSING AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE 
Introduction 
This section first briefly discusses nuclear fuel reprocessing and 
its attendant potential hazards. It then discusses the different types, 
hazards and problems associated with radioactive waste storage focusing 
primarily on high-level waste. It concludes with the discussion of the 
Audit Council's review of the BRH inspection program at the Chem-Nuclear 
Services low-level radioactive waste burial facility. 
Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing 
The highly radioactive thin metal (zircalloy) rods containing nuclear 
fuel that is 11spent11 are sent to temporary storage in holding pools 
where they are allowed to cool for a period of several months. These 
spent-fuel rods may be sent to a Federal reprocessing facility such as 
the one at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). The rods are put through 
a chemical process which recovers radioactive elements that can be used 
in a variety of ways including for new fuel. Figure 3 is a simplified 
diagram of the nuclear fuel cycle taken from an international research 
project being conducted principally from Clark University in Worcester, 
Massachusetts. Table 3 provides the definitions used in identifying 
potentially catastrophic hazards which are presented in Figure 3. 
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TABLE 3 
Typology of catastrophic nuclear risks. 
Key: T - theft; S - sabotage; and A - accident. 
Fuel Cycle Nuclear 
Hazard TyEe 
Fission Product Pu 
Stage ExElosion Release DisEersal 
Mining I Milling I and 
Refining 
Enrichment and Fuel 
Fabrication T S,A S,A 
Light Water Reactor S,A S,A 
Fuel Reprocessing T S,A S,A 
Plutonium Storage T S,A 
Waste Disposal S,A S,A 
The potential hazards relating to reprocessing are similar to those 
associated with the operation of a nuclear power plant; release of radio-
active material in hazardous amounts through theft, sabotage, or accident. 
Spent nuclear fuels are moved primarily by truck to SRP. In a 
typical year 109 shipments of spent-fuel will arrive at SRP by truck but 
only 10 spent-fuel shipments will leave by truck. The "typical11 99 
shipments which remain are an indication of the volume of reprocessing 
that takes place there. 
SRP is a facility managed by the Department of Energy where the 
main responsibility is to prepare materials for the national defense 
program. For this reason, details of activities I security practices, 
volumes of radioactive materials and related information is classified and 
not available to the State. 
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A commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facility was built outside of 
Barnwell by Allied-General Nuclear Services, Inc. (AGNS). However, 
due to decisions by former President Ford and President Carter to 
delay commercial reprocessing, this plant has not been licensed to 
conduct reprocessing operations. It has received Federal funding to 
conduct research relating to (1) spent-fuel transportation, receiving, 
handling, and storage; (2) security and safeguards; and (3) alternative 
fuel cycles . 
Only one commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facility has ever 
operated in the United States; the plant in West Valley, New York 
owned by West Valley Fuel Services, Inc. It operated intermittently 
from 1966 to 1972 when it was closed permanently. Its operation had 
been halted periodically by technical problems or by legal suits brought 
by local residents and concerned scientists protesting that the plant's 
operation caused health and pollution hazards. 
Reprocessing is considered the largest single source of high-level 
radioactive waste which has no further potential for recovery of useful 
materials. It must be stored securely. The closed plant at West Valley, 
New York has 600,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored at 
the site in underground steel tanks. 
Radioactive Waste Storage 
The potential hazards associated with storage of radioactive waste 
are essentially the same as those associated with nuclear power plants 
and nuclear fuel reprocessing; release of a dangerous quantity of 
radioactive material to the environment. There are different types of 
radioactive waste which have their own unique requirements for safe 
storage and which present different types and levels of potential hazard. 
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The Audit Council has divided the types of waste into four categories 
based on current storage practices and plans. 
(1) Permanent Storage 
Defined as storage of waste materials in a manner and place 
that, by design, prevents future retrieval or moving of the material. 
The waste is intended to remain in this storage environment at 
least until it has experienced enough normal radioactive decay so 
that it no longer presents a radiation hazard. Low-level radioactive 
waste burial facilities are the only storage sites in this category. 
The Chern-Nuclear burial facility near Barnwell is a commercial site 
and one of only three (the others are federally operated) in the 
United States. 
No permanent storage method for high-level radioactive waste 
has yet been developed and implemented. High-level wastes are 
stored in semi-permanent tanks at Federal facilities; the West 
Valley, New York tanks; or are being held at short-term or interim 
storage sites. 
(2) Short-Term Storage 
When spent-fuel is removed from a reactor core to make room 
for new fuel rods, it is placed in cooling pools at the reactor site 
or another reactor site. It is stored in a manner convenient for 
retrieval and transfer to another site. Initial design of these 
ponds assumed that the spent-fuel would stay no more than six 
months and then be transferred to a reprocessing facility. With 
the ban on reprocessing, short-term storage sites at many reactors 
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are becoming full and are taking on the characteristics of interim 
storage. 
Short-term storage also refers to storage of all other radio-
active materials at or near the site where the material is produced 
pending transfer to more permanent storage. It includes low-level 
waste such as gloves I booties 1 coveralls I and test sources. 
(3) Interim Storage 
Indefinite temporary storage of radioactive spent-fuel and 
other high-level waste while policy is being developed to either 
proceed with fuel reprocessing or transfer the waste material to a 
permanent storage site. The cooling ponds at reactor sites are 
being utilized as interim storage. The NRC has approved new 
storage configurations of spent-fuel rods which can significantly 
increase the holding capacity of the cooling ponds. 
( 4) Long-Term/Semi-Permanent 
To date this type of storage facility does not exist. The 
Federal Government has been exploring methods for permanent 
underground storage of solidified high-level radioactive waste. 
The material would be stored in containers and in a configuration 
that would allow retrieval 1 transfer I and inspection of containers. 
The most recent efforts are focused on the feasibility of constructing 
a semi-permanent geological storage facility inside huge salt domes 
located in remote unpopulated areas. 
This has been a highly controversial national and international 
policy issue primarily because the radioactive half-life of some 
isotopes are measured in tens and hundreds of thousands of years. 
-77-
There is uncertainty as to whether the techniques, storage containers, 
and security mechanisms which could be implemented with current 
technology would be sufficiently durable to guarantee security of 
the stored waste for future generations. 
Below are definitions of the three types of radioactive waste which 
would be included in this type of storage. The definitions are from a 
report by the General Accounting Office. 
High-level waste - has extremely high radioactivity -
as much as 10,000 curies*** per gallon. This waste 
is characterized by high levels of penetrating 
radiation I high heat generation rates, and a long 
toxic life. High-level waste is created when reactor 
spent-fuel elements are dissolved in acid to recover 
unused uranium and plutonium for reuse as nuclear 
fuel. It is the acid solution remaining that is 
referred to as high-level waste. It contains virtually 
all the fission products**** and small amounts of 
transuranics - such as plutonium - which are not 
recovered during the reprocessing operations. It is 
one of the most hazardous and complex of all radio-
active wastes to manage. 
Transuranic contaminated waste** - contains much 
lower concentration of radioactivity than high-level 
waste. It is generated by plutonium fuel fabrication 
and fuel reprocessing facilities and laboratories 
using transuranic elements. This waste generally 
consists of absorbent tissues, clothing, gloves, 
plastic bags I equipment, filters from effluent treat-
ment systems, and fuel hulls which remain after 
fuel reprocessing. 
Spent-fuel - contains all the fission and transuranic 
elements that are found in high-level waste and all 
**Transuranic elements are man-made, long-lived, and extremely toxic. 
These elements - such as plutonium - are created during the normal 
nuclear reaction process. They are found in several nuclear fuel cycle 
operations and are contained in nuclear waste in varying concentrations. 
***CU:rie - a measure of the quantity of radioactive material. See glossary. 
****Fission products - those isotopes formed during the nuclear reaction 
process that are not part of the transuranic elements. Some of these 
isotopes are hazardous for hundreds of years. 
-78-
the uranium and plutonium not used during the 
nuclear reaction. Spent-fuel is characterized by 
high levels of penetrating radiation I high heat 
generation rates I and a long toxic life. 
Low-level wastes I such as those stored at Chem-Nuclear fuel 
services are solid and may not contain transuranic contamination in 
excess of 10 nanocuries (1 nanocurie = 1 billionth of a curie) per gram 
of material. 
The hazards to public health and safety posed by radioactive waste 
storage should be viewed from two perspectives 1 short-range and 
long-range. 
The short-range radiation hazards will arise if a large enough 
quantity of the material escapes into the environment and contaminates 
soil and/or water. A high level of contamination would present an 
immediate hazard in the unlikely event of a major break in a storage 
tank. 
The long-range radioactive hazards derive from the uncertainty of 
the effective life span of waste storage systems. Numerous older storage 
tanks have developed many cracks and leaks in their primary walls. 
Some radioactive wastes will remain hazardous for hundreds of thousands 
of years . Bearing directly on this problem is the following summary of 
criticisms made by the General Accounting Office in a September 1977 
report on the problems of radioactive waste disposal. These problems 
still are being discussed and solutions are being sought but have not 
been resolved. The GAO found: 
Gaps in Federal laws and regulations governing the 
storage and disposal of nuclear waste. 
Geological uncertainties and natural resources 
trade-offs encountered when selecting "permanent" 
disposal locations. 
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Lack of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulatory 
criteria for orderly waste management operations, 
such as solidification of waste, designing proper 
waste containers, and transporting nuclear waste. 
Overly optimistic schedules for demonstrating the 
safety of the Energy Research and Development 
Administration's proposed waste disposal locations 
and waste management practices. 
Lack of demonstrated technologies for the safe 
disposal of existing commercial and defense high.;.level 
waste. 
Over 21 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste are stored at 
the SRP. There are two nuclear power plants owned by utility companies 
in operation in South Carolina which are filling their temporary spent-fuel 
storage capacity and must transfer the fuel rods to holding pools at 
other plants. 
Other than coordination with State officials for security of the 
civilian movements of spent-fuel, the State has had little involvement 
with security and safety measures for high-level radioactive waste 
either for short-term considerations or for long-term considerations. 
The State's emergency response capability is not geared specifically 
for hazards involving stored radioactive waste. The State Plan does 
contain provisions for emergency warning and evacuation. However, 
the State has no formal mechanism or policy regarding guaranteed 
long-term safeguards against public health and safety hazards which 
potentially may arise from the semi-permanent storage of high-level 
waste at SRP and elsewhere. This is unusual when contrasted with the 
carefully detailed planning and monitoring which has frequently charac-
terized the State's preparation for storage of the much less hazardous 
low-level radioactive waste at the Chem-Nuclear storage facility. 
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Low-level Radioactive Waste Burial at the Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 
Site 
Since May 1971 when burial of low-level radioactive waste began at 
Chern-Nuclear, through September 1979, 8 ,984,496. 50 cubic feet of 
waste material have been buried there. The activities of the burial 
facility are covered under DOT regulations, NRC regulations, and State 
regulations in addition to the conditions of the firm's State license. 
The types of hazards associated with this facility, as with high-level 
wastes, may be divided into short-term and long-term categories. The 
short-term potential hazards have to do with improper packaging or 
handling of the waste prior to burial which may result in a dangerous 
exposure to the public or employees or the spread of contamination in 
an accident on or off the site. 
The long-term hazards are related to possible degradation of the 
burial trenches which could possibly permit leakage of radioactive 
material into the ground. Erosion of the surface soil over a closed 
trench could result in unhealthy levels of radiation at the trench surface. 
The BRH maintains two types of inspection programs at Chern-Nuclear. 
One program involves the inspection of operations and health and safety 
related management practices at Chern-Nuclear. Comprehensive semi-annual 
(announced and unannounced) inspections are conducted which include 
(1) review of the health records and radiation dosage records of all 
employees and the record-keeping practices, (2) radiation health safety 
practices, (3) physical inspection of burial trenches and decontamination 
facilities, ( 4) checks for corrective action taken to remedy problems 
cited in previous inspections, and (5) other areas related to radiation 
health and safety and compliance with all applicable regulations and 
license conditions. Unannounced inspections and daily routine observations 
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are made by BRH inspectors assigned to the site on a rotating basis. 
In addition I environmental surveillance equipment is located on and 
around the site. 
These inspections have two categories of findings "items of non-
compliance" and "violations." A violation is cited when the problem is 
of such nature and magnitude that public health and safety are jeopard-
ized. 
The BRH has authority to levy fines and if "willful violations" are 
found to exist they may result in a jail sentence. BRH has very strong 
regulatory authority at Chem-Nuclear which includes adding amendments 
to the license conditions when circumstances warrant. 
In the past there have been no Federal Regulations or criteria for 
burial of low-level radioactive waste. The NRC is in the process of 
promulgating such regulations and they are based primarily on the 
license conditions established by the BRH for the Chern- Nuclear facility. 
The second inspection program maintained by the BRH at Chem-
Nuclear is the inspection of each waste shipment that arrives at the 
facility. The inspectors have the authority to forbid burial of material 
which violates the license conditions or require further security measures 
such as decontamination I further solidification I or additional packing 
material. Certain shippers have been denied temporarily the right to 
send their waste to Chern- Nuclear because of excessive violations and 
unsafe packaging. Shipments have been resumed after the shippers 
have certified to the BRH that they have improved the radiation safety 
of their shipping and packaging procedures. 
The Audit Council observed the inspections of several shipments 
and reviewed the records of all inspections of shipments made from 1975 
through December of 1979. In April of 1979 the BRH increased the 
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volume of inspections significantly. It was not until October of 1979 
that the BRH established the policy of inspecting every shipment every 
day prior to entry into the burial facility. The yearly total of shipment 
inspections is shown in Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4 
Number of BRH Inspections 
Year at Chern-Nuclear 
1975 2 
1976 0 
1977 24 
1978 32 
1979 21948 
Of the 21893 inspections conducted from April through December of 
1979 I a total of 394 discrepancies or violations were noted in the BRH 
records. One hundred fifty-nine (159) of these were of a serious 
nature with the potential for posing a health or safety hazard to the 
public. These were reported to the shipper and to the NRC for correc-
tive action. 
The Audit Council's review of the April to December 1979 inspections 
distinguished between discrepancies and serious violations. As a measure 
of the effectiveness of the inspection program I Table 5 shows that as 
the volume of inspections increased 1 the number of serious violations 
tended to decline. Figure 4 displays this data graphically. 
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TABLE 5 
DISCREPANCIES FOUND ON INSPECTION OF SHIPMENTS AT CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC. 
April-December 1979 
Auri1 Ma J s N D 
- - - - ~ - -
Number of Inspections 294 533 434 403 239 38 118 461 373 
Number of Discrepancies/ 
Remarks Found in Examining 
28(1) 28 (2) BRH Log at Chem-Nuc1ear 103 56 65 42 2 15 55 
Number of Discrepancies 
Serious Enough to be 36 35 25 23 17 3 1 11 7 
Reported to NRC 
-----------------~- -· -- ------ --L-- ~------ ~I..-
-L-
(1) Due to method of record-keeping of discrepancies found on-site at Chem-Nuclear, some discrepancies 
were missed and not recorded. 
(2) Discrepancies/remarks found in December were only for December 1-17, 1979. 
(3) A total of 159 discrepancies were reported. One discrepancy report was not dated. 
. 
1DTAL 
2,893 
394 
158 (3) 
fiGURE 4 
VOLUME Of Bt<H INSPECTIONS AND DISCREPANCIES FOUND IN SHIP.Mf:NTS 
w-- ------
TO CHEM-NUCLEAR RADIOACTIVE WASTE BURIAL FACILITY 
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N umher of discrepancies/remarks. 
Number of discrepancies reported to NRC. 
The types and number of violations found during these inspections are 
listed below: 
Free-standing liquids in cask or container (27 
violations) 
Violations resulting in insecure cask or trailer (21) 
Trailer or package contarrrination (17) 
Placard or labeling violation (17) 
Missing or loose bolts on cask (9) 
Material not packaged in strong, tight package (9) 
Shipment forms inaccurate (9) 
Excessive radiation levels (9) 
Improper sealing of cask or container (5) 
Visible leakage of container ( 4) 
Lid on drum not properly fastened ( 4) 
Improper container for type of material ( 4) 
Package damage (4) 
Improper loading of trailer (2) 
Shipping cask did not meet NRC certification (2) 
Stripped threads on cask bolts (2) 
Offloading discrepancies (2) 
Other (12) (Violations reported only once to NRC.) 
The Audit Council's review of the BRH inspections of shipments to 
Chem-Nuclear and the inspections of operations found that these inspection 
programs are important deterrents to unsafe practices. As was discussed 
and recommended in the transportation section earlier, we feel that the 
BRH and the General Assembly should take action to ensure that the 
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State maintains a rigorous inspection program for hazardous materials 
including an inspection of each radioactive waste shipment sent to 
Chern-Nuclear. 
The BRH inspectors have neither the authority nor the expertise 
to look for serious safety violations of DOT regulations. For example, 
they do not inspect brake systems of trucks arriving at Chern-Nuclear. 
However, they have reported obvious safety violations such as worn 
tires and cracks in the chassis to the shipper or the motor carrier's 
home office. This would be a convenient area for Public Service Commis-
sion transportation inspectors to expand their inspections of radioactive 
materials' shipments while receiving training from the BRH in monitoring 
for excessive radiation. 
Audit Council recommendations regarding the inspection program 
are cited on pages 41 and 71. 
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POTENTIAL HAZARDS AS SOCIA TED WITH NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
FABRICATION AND OTHER ACTIVITIES INVOLVING 
RADIATION HAZARDS 
Fabrication 
The Savannah River Plant carries out fabrication activities for the 
nation's nuclear weapons program. The hazards to public health and 
safety from these processes are essentially the same as presented by 
fuel reprocessing I reactor operation I and waste storage, discussed 
previously. The threat resulting from sabotage or terrorist activity 
may be greater in this area because of the potential strategic value of 
nuclear weapons components, especially components containing plutonium. 
As part of the security requirements for the national defense· 
. 
effort I the State does not have access to fabrication activities nor to 
shipping information about defense-related materials. 
The Westinghouse Corporation has a nuclear fuel fabrication plant 
located near Columbia. The plant receives uranium hexaflouride which 
is chemically processed into nuclear fuel pellets. The pellets are hand-
loaded into the fuel rods at the plant and the rods are shipped to 
nuclear reactors in South Carolina and elsewhere. 
The most significant radiation hazard associated with fuel fabrication 
is the potential for workers inside the plant to ingest airborne contamina-
tion. This facility is licensed and inspected by the BRH. The Bureau 
also maintains airborne contamination samplers and film badges around 
the plant site in order to detect any releases of radiation. No hazardous 
releases have been detected in the plant's history and no contamination 
accidents involving radiation injury to employees have been reported. 
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Other Sources of Radiation Hazard 
The other sources of radiation in the State are varied and widely 
dispersed around the State. Most of these sources are used in minute 
amounts in medical treatment, scientific research or industrial applications, 
which under certain circumstances could present a hazard to an individual 
if mishandled. However, they are not considered as being a potential 
hazard to public health and safety which could involve a large radiation 
dose to an individual or to a large geographic area. 
The management of the BRH, however, unhesitatingly identifies the 
potential public health hazard from misuse of x-ray equipment as a 
greater threat than the potential hazards associated with the nuclear 
power industry. They consider the potential radiation hazards from a 
transportation accident as the second worst potential radiation danger. 
The BRH staff pointed out that until 1969 there were no State 
regulations or licensing requirements for operation of x-ray equipment. 
Although BRH now is responsible for registration and inspection of 
x-ray equipment facilities and their operation,· they continue to find 
problems relating to inadequate training of operators and inadequate 
shielding to protect the public. Because of regular exposure the health 
hazards tend to be greater for workers in the vicinity of inadequately 
shielded x-ray equipment than for patients who seldom are in the same 
area. 
Since the potential hazards in this area are not of a magnitude to 
warrant a mobilization of the State's emergency preparedness agencies, 
they were not reviewed by the Audit CounciL However, this is another 
area where the State's licensing and inspection program, conducted by 
the BRH, is an important safeguard for public health. 
-89-
SECTION THREE 
SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS INVOLVING 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Introduction 
This section discusses the nuclear related accidents/incidents that 
have occurred in South Carolina and what response measures were 
taken. It also briefly discusses the State's budget for emergency 
preparedness and the costs associated with accidents/incidents. 
Types and Numbers of Radiological Accidents/Incidents in South carolina 
1965-1979 
State record-keeping for nuclear accidents/incidents began in 
February 1965. The State's nuclear emergency response plan requires 
that the BRH be notified of any emergency involving radioactive materials. 
If circumstances warrant, the Emergency Radiological Assistance Team 
(ERAT) will be dispatched to the scene. Appendix 8 shows the chain 
of command for response to a disaster as outlined in the State Plan. 
In addition, the Bureau of Radiological Health has developed radia-
tion exposure guides for protective action which require notifying the 
BRH of incidents involving exposure of 2 mr. /hr. or more to the whole 
body. At this level of exposure potential harm to public health and 
safety could occur. Protective action guides, however, have not yet 
been developed by the BRH for contamination levels. Therefore, deter-
mining those incidents which could pose a potential threat to the public 
health is determined by the BRH on a case-by-case basis. Currently, 
the BRH uses DOT contamination limits to assess whether a radiological 
-90-
, 
incident could be hazardous to the public. These limits currently are 
220 dpm/cm2 for beta/gamma radiation and 22 dpm/cm2 for alpha contami-
nation I or a surface radiation limit of 200 mr. /hr. 
Through December 1979 1 104 non-military nuclear accidents/incidents 
have been reported to and investigated by the BRH. This number 
represents 63 incidents that were potential radiological hazards to public 
or worker health and safety. Thirty-one incidents were reported to 
which the Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) responded but which 
posed no radiological hazard to the public. Ten incidents were reported 
which did not require a response by the BRH. 
Of the 104 reported incidents I only 33 incidents directly involved 
South Carolina radiological material licensees. The following chart 
indicates the number of incidents reported each year from 1965 through 
1979. 
Number of Incidents Number of 
Number of Which Posed a Potential Incidents 
Incidents Radiological Hazard Involving 
Year ReEorted** to the Public or Workers Licensees 
1965 1 1 -* 
1966 1 1 -* 
1967 2 2 -* 
1968 2 2 -* 
1969 3 2 0 
1970 3 2 1 
1971 7 7 5 
1972 8 2 3 
1973 4 4 0 
1974 3 2 1 
1975 8 5 1 
1976 9 2 5 
1977 16 6 4 
1978 21 15 7 
1979 16 10 6 
TOTAL 104 63 33 
*B RH did not begin licensing for possession, use, etc. of radioactive 
materials until 1969. 
**The increase in incidents tends to correspond with the increased 
activity involving radioactive materials in South Carolina. 
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Of the 104 incidents on file with the BRH, 10 incidents were 
reported to which no radiological hazard to the public health and safety 
existed and for which no response by the BRH was necessary other 
than to remain on standby alert for possible action. The following 
types of incidents posed no radiological hazard to the public: 
Radioactive shipments reported lost, abandoned or 
on the wrong designated route (3 incidents) 
Bomb threats and earth tremors in areas around 
nuclear facilities (2) 
Accidents reported to involve radioactive material 
(2) 
Dosimeters off-scale (1) 
Fire at a nuclear facility (1) 
Reported Civil Air Patrol/Disaster Preparedness 
Agency exercise (1) 
Thirty-one incidents were reported from 1969-1979 which were 
investigated by the BRH with radiation surveys or smears taken which 
showed no radiation above normal background levels. These incidents 
posed no radiological hazard to the public health and safety. Included 
in these incidents were the following: 
Loss/theft of radioactive materials (7 incidents) 
Accident involving radioactive shipments (6) 
Inadequate or damaged packaging in transportation 
of radioactive materials (5) 
Material found labeled contaminated or radioactive 
(4) 
Reported radiation in landfill (2) 
Radioactive material spilled (2) 
Suspected contamination of air or water supply (2) 
Birth defect in puppies thought caused by radiation 
(1) 
Injured worker thought contaminated in an accident 
(1) 
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Radiation emissions suspected from induction heat 
generator (1) 
The remainder of incidents (63) reported to and investigated by 
the BRH involved radiation measures above background radiation levels 
of . 01 mr. /hr. Although 63 incidents were reported with radiation 
levels above background readings, only a small portion of those incidents 
posed a potential radiological hazard to the public health and safety. A 
greater number posed a radiological hazard to workers in the immediate 
vicinity or handling the materials. 
Using the above guides for assessing the potential radiological 
hazard to the public health and safety, the following types of incidents 
were reported which resulted in individual exposure to radiation levels 
in excess of 2 mr. /hr. : 
Radiography overexposure (7 incidents) 
Dosimeter/badge overexposure (3) 
Exposure to staff member during treatment of 
hospital cancer patients (1) 
Accidental radioactive release (1) 
Overexposure at nuclear power facility (1) 
Contamination in university laboratory experiment 
(1) 
Radioactive material spilled (1) 
Of these 15 incidents, none posed a potential radiological hazard to 
public health- and safety. Ten incidents, however, either resulted in 
exposures above acceptable limits to workers handling radioactive materials 
or posed a potential radiological hazard to these workers. 
Contamination levels of 220 dpm/cm2 or radiation levels of 200 
mr. /hr. were exceeded in 5 incidents of the following description: 
Low-level waste container contamination (3 incidents) 
Contamination from radium source (1) 
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Contaminated clothing from faulty packaging of 
radioactive materials (1) 
While one of these contamination incidents did pose a potential 
hazard to public health and safety from possible ingestion of radioactive 
particles 1 no radiation injuries were reported. Four of the incidents 
posed an occupational hazard to workers handling or transporting the 
radioactive materials. 
In addition to the above incidents which exceeded acceptable 
standards of radiation exposure or contamination I an additional 43 
incidents were reported in which either radiation measures did not 
exceed protective action guides or DOT limits or radiation measures 
were not specified in the reports in the above stated form. These 
incidents I which did not pose a significant radiological hazard to the 
public I included the following: 
Radioactive shipments leaking or contaminated I 
inadequate containers (8 incidents) 
Transportation accidents (7) 
Unplanned release from nuclear facility into air or 
water supply ( 5) 
Radium leakage from source I radium contamination 
(6) 
Tritium or other radioactive material contamination 
(3) 
Radioactive shipment received by mistake I wrong 
order (2) 
Radioactive source lost/stolen I then found (2) 
Radioactive material found (2) 
Radiography incident (2) 
Contaminated workers (2) 
Nuclear laundry overflow into sewer (1) 
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Overexposure investigation in hospital treatment of 
patients (1) 
Condensation atop radioactive waste containers (1) 
Fire involving radioactive· materials (1) 
According to officials at the BRH 1 seven of the above incidents 
had the potential to become a radiological hazard to public health and 
safety although public health was never actually jeopardized. Seven of 
these incidents posed an occupational radiation hazard to the workers 
handling radioactive materials. 
For the incidents which involved radiation measures above background 
levels which had the potential for presenting a radiological health hazard 
to the public I one or more members of the BRH Emergency Radiological 
Assistance Team (ERAT) responded upon notification of each incident. 
Response times varied from arriving at the scene of the incident within 
one hour of notification to investigating one and one-half months after 
notification at a scheduled licensee inspection. The Peacetime Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan outlines procedures for notifying the BRH of 
an incident based on the severity of the incident and ranges from 
notifying immediately to notifying within 30 days of the incident. 
Response from the BRH to the incident is determined according to the 
magnitude of the incident. 
Once the ERA T arrived at the scene I responses varied based on 
the nature of the incident. Typical responses included taking radiation 
surveys I smears or air and water samples to determine if potential 
radiological hazards to the public existed I monitoring personnel I super-
vising decontamination procedures when needed I inspecting shipments I 
giving training to prevent reoccurrence of incidents I impounding or 
disposing of sources I reprimanding for late notification I assisting in 
-95-
I 
locating lost or stolen sources and advising on additional actions to be 
taken. 
None of the incidents reported to the BRH have required implementing 
the Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan. However I in 
several instances the BRH was assisted by other State agencies and 
local agencies and organizations in handling reported radiological incidents. 
None of the reported incidents has resulted in a radiation casualty. 
Budget and Cost Factors Relating to Nuclear Emergency Preparedness 
The Audit Council reviewed the State's budgetary commitment to 
emergency preparedness at both the State and local level from FY 77 
through FY 80. Total funds for overall emergency preparedness have 
declined I although the support for nuclear emergency preparedness has 
increased slightly in certain areas. This increase I however, has not 
been commensurate with the growth of nuclear industry in the State. 
In general, the adequacy of the State's emergency preparedness is 
determined by the emergency response capability at the local level. 
Emergency personnel at the local level, are almost always the first 
officials to become involved when a hazardous situation arises. The 
quality of their training, degree of experience and availability of equip-
ment are important factors in determining the effectiveness of their 
immediate actions. The availability of funds at the local level necessary 
to maintain high standards of emergency preparedness has declined 
significantly in recent years. Table 6 summarizes the sources and 
expenditures of emergency preparedness funds for FY 77 through 
FY 80. 
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Recipient of runds 
Emergency Pre-
pared ness Division, 
Adjutant General's 
Office (formerly 
Disaster Prepared-
ness Agency) 
Bureau of Radio-
logical llealth, 
Department of 
llealth and 
Environmental 
Control 
rederal funds 
funneled Through 
r.ro to Counties 
and Cities 
--~--
Cit.y and County 
funds for 
Emergency 1 Preparedness ( ) 
TOTAl.S 
--. 
See notes attached. 
TABLE 6 
FUNDING AND EXPI:NDITURES FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, FY 1977-FY 1980(l)(Z) 
FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980 
---Source of 
Ex2ended(3) Funds ~~eted_ Ex2ended Budgeted Ex2ended Budqeted ElCJ:!ended Budget~!!_ 
State 317,881 243,415 329,920 261,690 211,567 205,353 209,299 -
Appropl'iations 
Federal 998,584 969,618 538,600 489,476 469,869 433,161 536,249 -
funds 
State 249,062 215,654 263,535 265 933(4) 301,229 300,606 419,965 -
' Appropriations 
36 464(5) Feder·al 36,464 35,040 33,754 57,274 28,794 96,329 -. 
Funds 
Federal 674,352 676,169(6) 463,138 490 no<6> 509,470 503,938 461,435 -
' Funds 
Local 674,352 676,169 463,138 490,710 509,470 503,938 461,435 -
funds 
-
federal, State, 2,95(),695 2,617,489 2,093,371 2,032,273 2,078,879 1,975,790 2,18'1,712 -
Local funds 
TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
Notes: 
(1) Information obtained from the Emergency Preparedness Division 
(EPD), Department of Health and Environmental Control, Governor's 
Office-Division of Administration and State Budget documents. 
(2) Figures for State Appropriations are based on the State fiscal year 
beginning July 1 and ending June 30. Federal funds are based on 
the Federal fiscal year beginning October 1 and ending September 30. 
(3) Figures for expenditures for FY 80 will not be available until the 
end of the Federal and State fiscal years. 
( 4) Total State funds expended exceeded State funds appropriated. 
Overexpenditure was covered by State funds not expended in 
other divisions within the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control. 
(5) DHEC records showed Federal funds budgeted at $15,465. However, 
a grant awarded during the fiscal year from which funds were 
expended was not shown in this figure. The total award figure 
was unavailable. Therefore, Federal funds budgeted and expended 
are shown to be equal. 
(6) The figure for budgeted Federal funds to cities and counties 
reflects the amounts initially allocated. However, during the year 
the EPD shifted some Federal funds originally allocated to its office 
for personnel and administration to the counties for personnel and 
administration. Therefore, expenditures exceeded original allocations 
in FY 77 and FY 78. 
(7) Actual figures for funds budgeted and expended by cities and 
counties for emergency preparedness were not available. However, 
all Federal funds to the local governments were provided on a 
50-50 match basis. Therefore, the cities and counties budgeted 
and expended at least equal funds to those received from Federal 
sources. 
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During this period emergency preparedness at the State level has 
been reorganized and streamlined in ways designed to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness. This restructuring has resulted in cost savings with 
improved efficiency and effectiveness and is undergoing continued 
scrutiny by the Governor's Task Force. However, as reported by the 
Governor's Task Force and the Joint Legislative Committee on Energy, 
reduction in funds at the local level has hampered efforts to improve 
emergency preparedness which already was considered marginally ade-
quate at best. 
It is a very difficult task to establish a priority of needs for 
funding emergency preparedness on a statewide basis. However, in 
order to ensure that emergency preparedness measures are adequate to 
protect public health and safety, this type of planning must be done. 
The Audit Council emphasizes that preventive measures, such as good 
licensing, inspection, and training programs, can be efficient, effective 
and economical aids to emergency preparedness. Therefore, these 
programs must receive thorough consideration as a part of overall 
emergency preparedness. 
Another consideration involves examining the past impacts and 
numbers of persons affected by known disasters. For example, natural 
disasters such as tornadoes and hurricanes have regularly caused 
hundreds of persons to be temporarily displaced or homeless in South 
Carolina history. Consequently, preparations for these types of disasters 
include accumulating blankets 1 food I clothing I and predesignating 
emergency shelters on a similar scale. 
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Attempting to assess potential economic impacts of disasters is 
another way of developing a perspective for establishing funding priori-
ties. Table 7 is a summary of the estimated costs of the accident at 
the Three-Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant developed from a report by 
the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Three-Mile Island. 
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TABLE 7 
--------
!;~r!'Ll'v!~TEf~ §!!Q!ri-TE!lJ~ ~~p !._Q~Q_:'!C[{MjXJ~n~s or _T!IE ACCID£~~T .... ~1L_IHH_fE-::!Jlll.E_ ISLAND 
-~--------~----------~----- -----~ 
Economic Impacts of the Accident at Three-f-1ile lsland(l) 
.. 
Evacuation 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
Non-manufacturing 
l'nJu:Hries 
Tourism 
-
Average Loss in Value of Production 
lMl -related Unemployment Compensation 
Losses to Milk .luggers r.~u:.!Ogt!Ogce.:.. .:..s _______ _ 
Immediate Loss in Value of Output 
SBA Loans to Businesses in 'lMI-Area 
Project<:-'<1 Long-Term Costs ( 3) 
Short-tenn Costs (Z) Mininllun Maximum 
$ 9,800,000_ - -
8,000,000 - -
118' 750 - -
60,000 - -
74,000,000 - -
510,000 - -
5,000,000 - -
~ 1 Heshlen~jal_ !!ousing - - -
--·----
(,_-:;) 
~-;-' ILiabHities Arising from 1MI Accident 1 
I 
Cost for :{t;pl acement Power 
Plant Sta nlt zatwn, Decontamtnatlon 
Preparations, Monitoring Radiation 
Costs to Utility I lixposure, 'IMI Investigations 
ExpcnseSTor TMI- 2 Removed From Utili t 
Hate Base and :Not Passed to Customers 
Repl acemcnt otE] ectnc C:.tmera tlng 
) 
-··------ 1 Capacity 
'IUI'AL('l) 
~-
-----------------
1,306,055 
32o,ooo.oool4l 
110,000,000 
80 000 ooo(S) z ! 
-
-· 
$608,794! 80S __ 
$ 1,306,055 $ 560,000,000 
576 000,000 1.644.000 000 
- -
- -
249,000,000 1 417 000 ooo(6) 
• • 
$826,306,055 $3,621,000,000 
(l) Sour·ce of infonnation was the g~~!:Lof the Governor's Commission on Three-Mile Island, Pennsylvania, 
rebrucu·y 26, 1980. 
(2) Short-t.enn costs foe· April 1979 through January 1980. 
(3) Long-term costs represent those costs that might be incurred in coming months and years. 
(4) Ten months (I $32 million a month. 
(5) Ten months @ $8 miJlion a month. 
(6) Includes cost for decommissioning TMI-2, if not refurbished. 
Cl) Totul costs must not he eonsider·ed to be inclusive of all costs for the accident at 'fMl. Studies are still 
under·way to determine the economic impacts and will not be completed for several year·s. These figures 
_______ s_h_o_u_l_d_b_c_uscd only as indicators of the ranoe of costs _f~r-~- major nucl_e_a~ acci~_e_n_t_. _ 
The State has not developed a comprehensive policy for funding 
and budgeting for nuclear emergency preparedness nor has this been 
done for general emergency preparedness. In the absence of such a 
policy deficiencies have developed in the level of preparedness, especially 
at the local level. Although the existing deficiencies are relatively 
minor, funding support is declining and the level of potentially hazardous 
activity is increasing dramatically as the State continues its rapid 
industrial growth. For example, the State has 13 nuclear reactors 
including three operational, four on standby, and one decommissioned at 
SRP. There are four operational reactors at private utilities and the 
"mothballed" reactor at the Parr plant. Six more reactors for nuclear 
power plants are under construction. In addition, there is an unknown 
number of nuclear reactors in the State's ports associated with the 
nation's nuclear submarine fleet. 
The increasing volume of potentially hazardous activity in the State 
will require the General Assembly to develop a policy, as outlined on 
page 8 of this report, to adequately protect the health and safety of 
South Carolina citizens. 
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J 
§uutlr <!lurulittu Jluu.sc uf i!{cpn!.sJ!ntntiue.s 
P.O. BOX 11867 • COLUMBIA. S.C. 29211 • TELEPHONE 758-5240 
April 17, 1979 
Nr. Roberts. Small, Jr., Chairman 
Legislative Audit Council 
P. 0. Drawer 10287 
Greenville, South Carolina 29603 
Dear Mr. Small: 
The recent accident at the nuclear power plant 
in Pennsylvnnia l::'evealecl that there cnn bl"' r->iqnifir::nnt · 
problems n~.J..-1tin9 to tile capabilities or <1 State to respond 
effectively in protecting lives and property when such 
accidents occur. 
In view of the concentration of nuclear facilities 
in South Carolina, we are requesting that the Legislative 
Audit Council undertake a comprehensive review of these 
issues as soon as practicable and provide a report in time 
for the next legislative session to consider. 
Your report should include, at a minimum, a summary 
of the types of potential nuclear related hazards and the 
State's response capabilities for each, a review of the types 
and number of nuclear relat~d accidents or incidents that 
have occurred· in the State and how they were handled, an 
evaluation of the adequady of our current nuclear response 
capabilities and recommendations. 
We will appreciate your prompt consideration of 
this request. 
-~ I* - .. _,· ¥/. /1 . - ~ -· ----=-· 
'::P~.~.-- 'rl I 5!V .... V£1.M,.&'p=" ( 
/nrs 
/J-L. 
Mr. Robert (' . April 17 1"·( Small, Jr. 
Page 2 , 979 
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TAB C 
ATrACHMENT VI 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
AND 
ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES 
WHEREAS, the operation of nuclear industries within the State 
. . 
of South Carolina is of benefit to the citizens of South Carolina; 
WHEREAS, prudent planning requires the development of emergency 
plans for nuclear industries in the unlikely event of an accident associated 
with these industries; 
WHEREAS, the Legislature of the State of South Carolina did by 
ACT NO. 223 and its subsequent amendments· designated the SOUTH CAROLINA 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL (DHEC) as the agency responsible 
for the regulatory control of sources of ionizing radiation and empower DHEC to 
issue such orders or -take such actions as necessary to meet emergency situations 
to protect the public health and safety;· 
WHEREAS, DHEC administers said ACT NO. 223 in accordance with an 
~ 
agreenent executed on September 15, 1969, by the Governor of the State of South 
Carolina and the United State Atomic Energy Commission; 
Whereas, for technical reason it is desirable to develop a single 
agency administration of ~adiation emergency plans involving peacetim~ radiation 
incidents; 
WHEREAS, this normal line of communication is through OHEC; 
J-7 
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THEREFORE,_ it is agreed that DHEC has jurisdiction and responsibility 
to control and direct the supporting off-site organizational groups in those 
emergency actions that may be required to protect the public health and safety as 
a result of a radiological incident at nuclear facilities owned and operated by 
& . 
ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES or a radiological transportat.ion incident which 
occurs within ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES' responsibility. It is further 
agreed that ALLIED-GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES will immediately notify the 
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL through its 
DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH in the event of a nuclear facility radiological 
incident or in the event of a transportation incident, within ALLIED-GENERAL 
NUCLEAR SERVICES' responsibility, which has the potential for or does involve 
the health and safety of the citizens of South Carolina outside the facility 
boundaries~ or which may or does involve abnormal contamination levels in the 
environment outside the facility environment. This agreement does not ~rohibit 
the notification of local emergency organizations in the_ event that this is 
deemed an expedient measure by appropriate faci.lity personnel. This agreement 
shall commence with the signing of this Memorandum.of Understanding and shall 
continue until expressly revoked. 
7/ll/75 
Date 
J.-8 
-110-
/ 
...,._ - I 
~/ / / 
~ ' . / ·- {.t.: - I I 
Deputy Corrmissioner for Enviror.mental 
Health and Safety 
For South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environmental Control 
ror A 11 i ed-Genera 1 Nuc 1 e . Services l:-~ 
A·. E. Schubert, President 
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Licensing & Inspection Schedules 
Radioactive material licenses shall be issued for a specific time period 
as set forth in the Licensing Schedule. Generally, licenses are issued 
for a five year period with the exception of waste burial facilities and 
nuclear laundries which are issued at three year intervals. Renewals of 
licenses are usually made for the same period of time for which they were 
initially issued. 
Licenses are grouped into four major types; medical, industrial, academic, 
and other. They are further identified in a specific category. 
Radioactive material license inspections shall be performed within cer-
tain intervals based on the type of license and priority. Priorities are 
determined by the type material, quantity, and use authorized by the li-
cense, and the potential health hazard. The intervals of inspection are 
outlined in the Inspection Priority Schedule. 
The following definitions shall apply: 
1. Initial inspection - time after issuance of a license; for teletherapy 
licenses, as soon as possible afte1· receipt of licensee's survey report. 
2. Reinspection - regular complete inspection. 
3. Extension - allowable interval beyond reinspection interval. No 
extension is applicable for Priority I licenses or active field 
radiographic operations. 
-112-
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Licensing Schedule 
Renewal Inspection 
Type of License Interval (years) Priority (I-IV) 
I. Medical 
A. Nuclear Medicine 5 III 
B. Pathology 5 III 
c. Teletherapy 5 I I I 
D. Pacemakers 5 III 
II. Industrial 
A. Gamma Irradiators 5 II 
B. Radiographers 5 II 
c. Gauges & devices 5 III 
0. Gauges & devices (small quantity, 
portable, etc.) 
GC's, 
5 IV 
I I I. Academic 5 I I I 
Academic small quantity 5 IV 
IV. Other 
A. Waste Burial 3 I 
B. Waste Collection 5 II 
c. laundries 3 II 
D. Service 5 IV 
All Broad Licenses regardless of type II 
-113-
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INSPECTION PRIORITY .L'.NO LJCENSE INTERVAL !JY C1UEGORY 
INSPECTION LICENSE 
CODE CATEGORY rR IOR ITY WTERVAL (YRS) 
BL l3road License (Any Type) II 5 
BT Brachytherapy III 5 
GC Contaminated Components IV 5 
EO Exempt Qty Distributors III 5 
FG Fixed Gauges I I I. IV 5 
GC Gas Chromatograph IV 5 
GI Gamma Irradiator II 5 
GL GL Distributor- I I I 5 
IR Industrial Radiographers II 5 
LA Lead Analysers IV 5 
LD Lead Detectors IV 5 
LS Large Sealed Sources ( 1 a b) rrr 5 
~ Medical Group {All Groups) II 5 
MV Mobile Nuclear Medicine Van III 5 
NL Nuc 1 ear Laundry II 3 
NM Nuclear Medicine rrr 5 
NS Neutron Sources lii 5 
PG Portable Gauges IV 5 
PM Pacemakers III 5 
PT Pathology III 5 
. RP Rad iophannacy III 5 
SA Subcritical Assemblies rr 5 
SL Service License IV 5 
SQ Small Quantity Lab I I I. IV 5 
ss Sma.ll Sealed Sources (lab) I ri, IV 5 
TL Teletherilpy I I I 5 
WB Waste Burial 3 
we ~laste Co11ection II s 
1tll . 1,•/ell LOC"Jf1~rs 
-us- T1 
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
D I G E S T 
FEDERAL ACTIONS 'ARE NEEDED 
TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND 
SECURITY OF NUCLEAR 
MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION 
Federal agencies responsible for the safe 
transportation of nuclear materials have 
not developed and enforced policies and 
regulations which adequately protect the 
public from exposure to radiation from such 
shipments. Deficiencies in Federal programs 
coupled with poor Federal-State interaction 
have caused States to become concerned about 
the safety of nuclear materials shipments 
even though the safety record has been good. 
As a result, State and local governments 
have begun to pass laws and regulations 
which could impede, and in some cases stop, 
the movement of nuclear materials between 
different State and local jurisdictions. 
Transportation of radioactive materials is 
vital to the Nation's use of nuclear mate-
rials for energy, medical, and other pur-
poses. Shipments include radioactive· wastes, 
reactor fuel, and material used for medical 
and industrial purposes. 
The Department of Transportation, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 
Department of Energy have responsibilities 
for the safe and secure transportation of 
nuclear materials. All of these agencies 
could strengthen their safety and security 
procedures. 
MORE ASSURANCE NEEDED THAT SHIPMENTS-ARE-SAFE _______ _ 
Safe shipping containers are the first line 
of defense in protecting the public from 
radioactive materials shipments, but inspec-
tion procedures do not adequately assure that 
containers meet Federal safety specifications. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
Department of Energy rely on container users 
and manufacturers to assure these containers 
Tear Sheet. Upon removal, the report 
cover date should btt noted hereon. 
i 
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meet Fcder.:~l :;,,if~t·:· ·.·i I !c .. tions. Neither 
agency indepcnr·]c·llt-.1·,, ::;~"r•'-•r·t_·: t:llf'Sf! Odckaqes 
to assure the'{ dC:F! ('l;'"~t r Lwt ,_,.1 propPrly and 
continue to tnPei· F~"'d,·; n I ~:t ;-~w'lard~:; after re-
peated use. 'l'he u~~~~.Jt t:IBl'ltL nt 'l'ransporta-
tion, on the other hand, qof'~3 some testing 
but does no t t e s t pEl c k ;) Q ,. G t: o s e e i f t hey 
meet perform21nce specificc.ltions. (See pp. 6 
to 8.} 
The Department of 'l'r,,nspoctalion and the 
Commission all6w levels o( radioactive con-
tamination on packages and transport vehi-
cles which are l!n!H?cessetrily high. This 
unnecessary radL1Lion cteatf!f> a potential 
hazard for transportation workers as well 
as the general public. (See pp. 8 to 10.) 
Commission requlations do not require re-
ceivers of Type A packages to monitor ra-
diation levels to make sure they comply 
with Federal regulations. Type A packages 
are used to ship materials such as slightly 
radioactive waste and radiopharmaceuticals. 
(See p. 10.) 
Neither the Department of 'l'ransportation nor 
the Commission adequately inspect shippers 
and carriers for compliance with Federal 
transportation regulations. A recent Depart-
ment of Transportation/Commission study con-
firmed the need for better surveillance, 
and at the same time illustrated the prac-
ticality of using State inspectors. (See 
pp. 10 to 12.) 
The Department of Transportation and the 
Commission have conllictJng regulations 
for packaging nuclear materials with a low 
specific activity--the mensure of radioac-
tivity in each gram of nuclear material. 
As a result, shippers following Transporta-
tion Department regulotions are sometimes 
cited by the Commissjon for violating Com-
mission regulations. (Seep. 12.) 
SECURITY NEEDS TO BE UP~HAUELJ 
The De par tmen t n f En~ nw a nr] the Cornrn iss ion 
require special secutity measure~ Ear ship-
ments o f we a p on::;- q r ad e P L u to n i u m a n d h i q h l y 
t 1 
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enriched uranium when the amount being 
transported reaches a specified quantity 
called the hstrategic level.~ However, cur-
rent Federal regulations for protecting less 
than strategic quantities are inadequate and 
should be upgraded. 
--No special security measures are required 
for shipments of weapons-grade materials 
which are only one or two grams below the 
strategic quantity level. The theft of 
multiple shipments below the strategic 
level could provide enough material to 
build a bomb. Also, plutonium of less 
than strategic quantities could be dis-
persed into the air to seriously endanger 
public health and safety in populated 
areas. 
--Separate shipments of less than strategic 
quantities of nuclear materials can be 
brought together into one unprotected 
transportation terminal. Thus, two or 
more shipments of weapons-grade material, 
which together exceed the strategic quan-
tity level, may be at one terminal at the 
same time--unprotected. 
--The current safeguards criteria do not 
adequately consider the effect enrichment 
levels have on the quantity of material 
needed to make a bomb. As a result, ship-
ments that would be less useful for making 
a bomb may be protected while more useful 
shipments are not. (See pp. 15 to 19.) 
~E~E~-!~~! 
Spent fuel is a highly radioactive material 
which is transported in massive, durable 
containers. Based on test results, its re-
lease from these containers in accidents 
appears unlikely. However, Federal agencies 
have not adequately considered the possibil-
ity of sabotage. The effects of sabotaging 
a spent-fuel container using high explosives 
cannot be accurately predicted because tests 
have not been done to determine the amount 
of spent fuel that would be released. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION •...••••••.•..••...•••.•..••• 
The S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control entered into a contract 
with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Department of Transportat-
ion to prqvide inspection and surveillance of radioactive material in transport 
within the state. The purpose of the contract (#NRC-06-77-020) was designed to ob-
tain information related to the condition of shipments, handling practices, radiat-
ion levels, and other pertinent data. The period of the contract work was from 
January 31, 1977 through February 1 , 1978. 
SCOPE OF CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS ••..•..••.• 
1. The State would visit selected carrier facilities at least quarterly dur-
ing the period of the contract. 
2. Perform radiation surveys to determine radiation levels at each work stat-
ion in terminals or warehouses. Post area monitoring devices at selected 
terminals and document radiation exposure levels. 
3. Perform contamination surveys at each work station and on radioactive mat-
erial packages and transport vehicles. 
4. Badge individual employees to determine personnel exposure. 
5. Perform package inspections to include radiation levels, labeling, marking, 
contamination, and shipping documents. 
6. Perform inspection on transport vehicles to document radiation levels, con-
tamination, placarding, transport index, and shipping documents. 
SURVEY PROCEDURES ...........•..•....•.... 
Eight terminals or facilities were selected in South Carolina to be included 
~nder the contract requirements. Of these, two were air freight terminals, two were 
motor transit terminals, three were courier or freight forwarder type terminals, 
and one was a combination transportation and low-level radioactive waste burial fac-
ility. Each of the facilities contacted were given a copy of an explanation notice 
(page A-1, Appendix). Arrangements were made with company officials for the state 
inspectors to enter upon the property for the purpose of inspection, monitoring and 
survey. After the first initial contact with the facility, all other visits and in-
spections were unannounced. 
Whereever possible, surveys of vehicles were made at the terminal prior to un-
loading of the radioactive material. An example of the vehicle inspection form is 
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shown on -page A-2 of the Appendix. 
Packages, containers and casks 1.vere inspected prior to de 1 i very to the con-
signee if possible. Shipping documents were inspected at the same time. An ex-
ample of the package inspection form is shown on page A-5 of the Appendix. 
Contacts, inspections, surveys, and analysis of contamination smears were con-
ducted by members of the technical staff of the Bureau of Radiological Health at 
the S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control, Columbia, SC. 
The following is a brief summary of work performed by the Bureau of Radiologic-
al Health during the period of this contract: 
Total number of man-days spent by BRH/DHEC personnel •................. 103 
Total State Funds comrni tted for contract ............................ SS ,240 
Total Federal Contract Funds recefved for contract •................ $5,000 
Number of Terminals Surveyed.......................................... 8 
Number of Contacts and interviews •................•.......•........... 21 
Number of Vehicles inspected .......................................... 28 
N_umber of Packages and Containers surveyed •.•......................... 212 
Number of Area and Personnel Monitoring Devices used .................. 112 
Contamination Smears analysed......................................... 80 
FINDINGS ................................ . 
Air Freight Terminals. 
Several air freight terminals in major cities in S.C. were visited to determ-
ine the extent of radioactive material being transported by air to and from the 
State. Compared to several other southeastern states, the number of radioactive 
material shipments carried by aircraft into S.C. was very low. Some terminals had 
not seen any radioactive shipments 11 for several months 11 to those that handle 11 about 
one a month 11 • The major mode of shipments of radiopharmaceuticals into S.C. was 
by highway. Radiapharmaceuticals are shipped by air into Douglas ~1unicipal Airport 
in Charlotte, N.C. then by highway carrier from Charlotte to a terminal in Columbia, 
S.C. The packages were then transported from the Columbia terminal to the consignee 
by courier vehicle. It is estimated that better than 90% of all radiopharmaceutic-
als shipped into S.C. are handled in this manner. 
-12~-
Total number of Packages inspected and surveyed •.•........•........... 212 
Number of Type A Packages .......................•............... 189 
Number of Type 3 Packages .................................•..... 18 
Number of Special Containers or Overpacks....................... 5 
Packages requiring No Lab 1 es. . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 27 
Packages ~tJith 'llhite I Labels .......................................... 26 
Packages with Yellow II Labels •...............•.....•.•.........•..... 35 
Packages with Ye 11 ow I I I La be 1 s • • . • • • . • . • • • • . • . . • • • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 7 
Shipments labeled RADIOACTIVE-LSA ..................................... 27 
Packages with security seal broken ..................•................. 0 
Packages or Containers with improper security seal .................... 3 
Packages or Cantai ners with no security sea 1 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 18 
:iumber of non-speci fi cation packages.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 1 
Type A Packages damaged (contents leaking) ............................ 0 
Type A Packages damaged (no leaking).................................. 5 
Type B Packages damaged (contents leaking) ............................ 0 
Type B.Packages damaged (no leaking) ................................ .. 
Total Transportation Index (TI)* .................................. 145.92 
Greater than 50 TI in terminal at one time............................ 0 
TI not recorded on package labels ..................................... 0 
Surface dose rate gr!ater than Yellow II limit"" ....................... 0 
Surface dose rate greater than Yellow III iimit* ...................... 0 
* Radiopharmaceutical Packages Only 
RADIOACTIVE PACKAGE SURVEY FINDINGS 
T.:l.SLE l 
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No radioactive contamination was detected on any trailers inspected by the 
State during this survey. An example of the vehicle inspecti-on form used is shown 
on page A-2 of the Appendix. 
Packages and Containers 
As part of this contract 212 packages were inspected and surveyed. A break-
down of package survey findings are shown in Table 1. 
In general packages of radiopharmaceutica1s were found to be packaged properly. 
Five packages were found to have seals damaged but none had actually opened during 
shipment. All radiopharmaceuticals inspected were shipped in approved DOT 7A pack-
ages. 
Shipments from most of the major suppliers were inspected but some shipments 
from New England Nuclear had the highest number of discrepancies detected during 
the contract survey. See Table 2. 
No contamination was found on any radiopharmaceutical .packages. No observat-
ions were made which indicated that radioactive packages were near animals or un-
exposed film. 
Shipments of radioactive waste into Barnwell, S.C. were inspected and several 
packages or containers had discrepancies. 
A shipment from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. consisted of sixty DOT 17H 55 gal 
drums with rim lock bands. Several of the drums were not sealed properly and several 
were not stenciled RADIOACTIVE-LSA. 
Part of a shipment of 96 drums of radioactive waste from the TVA Brown's Ferry 
Nuclear Plant were not as described in the shipping documents. 
A shipment of 55 drums of radioactive waste from the LSU Medical Center was 
not packaged properly and not as described in the shipping documents. 
Georgia Power Company shipped radioactive waste from the E. I. Hatch Nuclear 
Station which was not as described in the shipping documents. 
Radioactive waste from the Fitzpatric Nuclear Plant in New York state consist-
ing of 76 drums was not as described in the shi~ping documents. 
A summary of transportation accidents involving radioactive material which were 
investigated by the Bureau of Radiological Health - DHEC is shown in the Appendix. 
Shipping Documents 
As part of the inspection and 
shipping documents were reviewed. 
radiopharmaceuticals were properly 
Certification, Proper DOT Shipping 
Transport Index. 
survey of Radioactive Materials in Transport, 
In general shipping documents associated with 
made out. Items reviewed included Shipper's 
Name, Transport Group, Labels Required, ~nd 
-124-
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GAO COMMENTS ON SPENT-FUEL TRANSPORTATION 
SAFETY AND SECURITY 
Spent-Fuel 
Spent-fuel is a highly radioactive material which is transported in 
massive, durable containers. Based on test results, its release from 
these containers in accidents appears unlikely. However, Federal 
agencies have not adequately considered the possibility of sabotage. 
The effects of sabotaging a spent-fuel container using high explosives 
cannot be accurately predicted because tests have not been done to 
determine the amount of spent-fuel that would be released. 
(sic. sentence missing from original document) 
cut-off level. In establishing these levels, the dispersal 
hazard of plutonium should be considered. In addition, the 
criteria should take into account the enrichment level of 
uranium since smaller amounts of highly enriched uranium are 
needed to make a weapon. 
Take immediate action to preclude enroute consolidation of two 
or more special nuclear materials shipments that together 
exceed the strategic levels. 
Determine if there is a need to safeguard spent-fuel shipments 
from sabotage by developing experimental data on the amount 
of radioactive material that could be released in a sabotage 
attach on spent-fuel casks using high explosives. 
If experimental data shows safeguards are warranted, ,develop 
a security system considering communication requirements, 
armed escort personnel, the least vulnerable transportation 
mode, and vehicle disabling features. 
-126-
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I I I . COMMONWEALTH AND FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS 
AND RESPONSE 
MARCH 28 THROUGH APRIL 2, 1979 
B. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 
1. Preparedness 
1.1 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania Department of Health (DOH) - After the Bureau 
of Radiological Health transferred from the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Hea~th to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Resources (DER) in 1971, the DOH did·not have any specialized 
capabilities in the radiation health area. It lacked personnel 
with appropriate competencies, _equipment, and a public health 
library. 
After the transfer, the Secretary of Health was replaced 
by the Secretary· of Environmental Resources as an ex-officio 
member of the Governo·r' s Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy 
Development and Radiation Control. This Committee was created 
by a legislative act in 1965 to promote commercial nuclear 
-energy and to respond to radiation-related problems. 
The Department of Health did not have a formal response 
plan for health aspects of a radiation emergency, and was not 
involved in developing the nuclear emergency annex to the 
Commonwealth's Disaster Operations Plan* which had been under 
preparation since 1975. As a result, the Commonwealth plan did 
not make adequate provision for community health needs. 
Designated responsibilities of the DOH included only emergency 
62 
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medical care and identification of dead and mortuary services .. 
The plan did not designate specific responsibilities for the 
unique needs of hospitals and private health care facilities 
during an emergency or for mass public health needs, such as 
plans for distributing potas~ium iodide.* 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW) The 
Department of Public Welfare has responsibilities in the field 
of mental health. Its Office of Mental Health had no special 
preparation for radiation emergencies, and the Department's 
responsibilities were not defined in the nuclear emergency 
annex to the Commonwealth's Disaster Operations Plan. 
1.2 Federal Government 
U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) - At 
the time of the accident, no coordinated federal response plan 
existed for meeting public health needs during nuclear emer-
gencies. As detailed in the Emergency Management section of 
this report, the Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear 
Emergencies, which included health planning, was not completed 
at the time of the accident. Discussions on the availability 
of an approved form of potassium iodide (KI) had been held 
·prior to the accident between DER' s Bureau of Radiation Pro-
tection and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Bureau of 
Radiological Health. KI is used to prevent uptake of radio-
active iodine by the thyroid gland in the event of iodine-131 
releases during a nuclear power plant accident. However, an 
approved form was not available on March 28, 1979. The federal 
government did not maintain a supply of potassium iodide for 
expeditious distribution to large populations. 
Radioactive iodine accumulates in the thyroid gland 
primarily during the first 12 hours after exposure, and at a 
63 
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slower rate over the second 12 hour period. KI will therefore 
significantly decrease uptake and retention of radioactive 
iodine if administered before or shortly after exposure. It 
will not be effective if administered more than 24 hours after 
exposure. Use of KI was not intended for exposures ·below 10 
rem and exposures during the TMI accident did not come close to 
approaching that level. 
2. Response 
2.1 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania Department of Health (DOH) - The Pennsylvania 
Department of Health's response to the TMI accident involved 
three major areas: providing proper technical guidance to the 
Governor and other public and private agencies on decisions 
related to health; providing useful information; and providing 
resources for mitigation of any population health impact. 
In order to provide technical guidance, the DOH required 
knowledge about the potential effects of radiation, their 
prevention, and amelioration. Dr. Gordon MacLeod, who was the 
Secretary of Health at that time, established contact with the 
Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) in DER, and on March 31, 
arranged for Dr. Niel Wald, Chairman of the Department of 
Radiation Health, University of Pittsburgh, to assist the 
Health Department as a full-time advisor. Wald drew upon his 
Department's capabilities, including its library, to supplement 
· DOH resources. Contact was maintained with the BRP and the 
Governor's Office to obtain information on the potential for 
population exposure, including information on the status of the 
Unit 2 reactor, and any radiation releases and dose estimates. 
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The Department arranged to have medical personnel and 
other resources available for the treatment of radiation 
injuries by contacting the federal Departments of HEW and 
Energy. In conjunction with .the Governor, Lieutenant Governor 
and others, the Department discussed preventive measures, 
including: sheltering and evacuation to minimize radiation 
exposure; potassium iodide administration to block thyroid 
uptake of radioiodine; and dissemination of accurate radiation 
health information to minimize unwarranted psychological 
stress. 
At BRP's request, the FDA arranged for a private firm to 
manufacture approximately 250,000 bottles of a super-saturated 
KI solution. The KI shipments, which began to 
burg on Sunday, March 31, 1979, became 
discussion between the Secretaries of Health 
arrive in Harris-
the subject of 
and Environmental 
Resources, and led to the shift in responsibility from DER to 
the Department of Health for KI management and distribution. 
Subsequently, DOH took physical custody of the shipment and 
prepared procedures for potential distribution 
The need for distributing KI was continuously re-
evaluated, and the DOH rejected an untimely federal 
recommendation for its distribution and administration. The 
Secretary of Health advised the Governor against distribution 
to nearby communities for the following reasons: 
• The shipments arrived at a time when reports from 
the site indicated an improving situation and 
smaller risks of additional public exposure. 
• The quality of the liquid KI shipment was not 
good: 
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Many bottles were not labeled. 
Filaments and other particulate matter were 
found in some samples. 
Many eye-droppers were improperly cali-
brated for the required dose. 
Only very low levels of radioactive iodine had 
been measured in milk and air samples taken 
frequently since March 28. 
• Public awareness of KI and its use was almost 
non-existent prior to March 28, and reports on it 
after that date were not entirely accurate. 
Misuse of the drug could produce side effects. 
• Announcement of the drug's availability at such a 
late date in the crisis could have produced a 
fearful public reaction. 
The Department of Health refused to release the drug to the 
public and to emergency management workers, and stored the 
shipment in a centrally located warehouse. The FDA has since 
reclaimed the shipment. 
As the accident continued, psychological stress on the 
public and on health professionals produced by the barrage of 
conflicting information became an increasing concern to the 
Health Department. Overloaded telephone exchanges contributed 
to significant communication problems among health organi-
zations. Although the Health Department made attempts to 
coordinate the response of the private health care system with 
activities of Commonwealth agencies, efforts were fragmented at 
66 
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5. Health Care Capabilities 
The Commonwealth should inventory and assess its emergency 
health care capabilities in all locations that might be 
affected by a nuclear accident, with the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Health assuming the lead role in this effort. 
6. Iodine-131 Blocking Agent Program 
A stable form of an iodine-131 blocking agent (Potassium 
Iodide) should be maintained in adequate supply for the general 
population in the emergency planning zones surrounding all 
nuclear power plants in the Commonwealth. In conjunction with 
PEMA, the Department of Health should develop a specific 
Potassium Iodide distribution plan as soon as possible, includ-
ing provision for availability of Potassium Iodide for 
emergency personnel. The Health Department should also develop 
a specific education program for health care personnel and the 
public in the emergency planning zones outlining procedures for 
its distribution and administration. 
114 
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APPENDIX 1 TO EMERGENCY ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH 
ANNEX, 8-7 
CHAIN OF COMMAND TO REPORT DISASTERS, 
COORDINATE RECOVERY EFFORTS, AND DEPLOY RESOURCES 
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RICHARD W. RILEY 
GOVERNOR 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
500 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
April 18, 1980 OI'I'ICS 01' EXECUTIVE POLICY AND PROGRAM$ 
This office has reviewed the Legislative Audit Council's draft report, 
An Evaluation of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness in South Carolina, and supports 
the principles set forth in the document's findings and recommendations. To 
the extent this report has addressed issues that were also a subject of study 
by the "Governor's Task Force for Emergency Response in Support of Fixed Nuclear 
Facilities", we have found the Audit Council's conclusions consistent with those 
of the Governor's Task Force. It is felt that this limited duplication is 
necessary and appropriate, as it focuses legislative attention on these vital 
issues and lends additional support to Task Force efforts. 
We commend the Audit Council in concentrating its efforts in areas beyond 
the scope of current Task Force activity and find the study to be both .compre-
hensive and thorough. This office concurs with the findings in these areas 
and feels that implementation of the principles of Audit Council recommendations 
will complement the efforts of the Governor's Task Force. 
The report makes specific recommendations regarding future issues to be 
addressed by the Governor's Task Force. These recommendations are noted and 
will be incorporated into the activities of the Task Force as appropriate. 
Thi~ office welcomes the opportunity to work with the Legislative Audit 
Council and looks forward to continued cooperation in addressing issues of 
mutual interest. 
LMT/JM/cs 
_Q Sincerely, 
"tu--~~ 
Lee M. Thomas 
Director 
Division of Public Safety Programs 
Edgar A. Brown Building, 1205 Pendleton Street, Columbia 29201 
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Sourh Carolina · 
Depalmenf of 
Healrhand 
Environmenbl 
Conlrol 
April 18' 1980 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
State of South Carolina 
620 Bankers Trust Tbwer 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
BOARD 
William M. Wilson. Chairman 
J. Lorin Mason, Jr., M.D., Vice-Chairman 
I. DeOuincey Newman, Secretary 
Leonard W. Douglas, M.D. 
George G. Graham. D.D.S. 
Michael W. Mims 
Barbara P. Nuessle 
COMMISSIONER 
RobertS. Jackson, M.D. 
2600 Bull Street 
Columbia, S. C. 29201 
'Ihe staff of the Bureau of Radiological Health has reviewed your 
draft report relative to the State's preparedness in the event of 
a nuclear emergency. Staff's cOITlrl'ents were reviewed with Ms. Carol 
Routh and Mr. Larry Hamilton. Based on this review an:i follow-up 
action taken by your staff, we concur with your plans to publish 
the report. 
'Ihank you for giving us the opportunity to review ani coill'l'ent 
on the report. 
Robert S. Ckson, M.D. 
Carmissioner 
RSJ:HGS:bo 
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STAT& OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
rHE PUI!IUC SERVICE COMMISSION 
I 
P. 0. DRAWER HNe 
COI.UM.IA, eouTH CAROLINA a•au 
April 18, 1980 
Mr. George L. Schroeder 
Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
620 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
RE: Report on extent of preparation 
in the event of a nuclear emergency 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
I am writing to formally advise you that the South 
Carolina Public Service Commission has elected not to file 
formal, written comments in regard to the above-referenced 
report, which is soon to be published by the Legislative 
Audit Council. 
At the request of your office, members of the 
Commission Staff reviewed the portions of the draft report 
relative to the role of the Commission in the enforcement 
of the regulations of the United States Department of 
Transportation relative to motor carriers of radioactive 
materials. That portion of the draft report was discussed 
with Ms. Carol Routh and Mr. Larry Hamilton of your office. 
As a consequence of that review and discussion, we have 
determined that formal comments of this Commission would 
not be necessary to explain or clarify the functions and 
responsibilities of this agency. 
If I may be of further assistance, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. 
RTB/kp 
Very truly yours, 
/?.M-7: &.~-
Robert T. Bockman 
General Counsel 
cc: James H. Still, Executive Director 
James T. Smith, Director 
Transportation Division 
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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
Rutledge Building 
MG ~ ESTON MARCHANT 
The Adjutant General 
1429 Senate Street 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Arpil 10, 1980 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
State of South Carolina 
620 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina· 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
BG 
QOIX GEORGE R. WISE 
Director 
I, and members of my staff, have reviewed your report on the State's 
preparedness in the event of nuclear emergency and concur with the 
comments ,contained therein; however, some of the items commented on 
have been or are being corrected. Some of these items are listed 
below, by page number, for your information. 
1. ·page VII -·Lack of Plan for Distribution of Potassium Iodide. 
·The Emergency Preparedness Division and the Bureau of Radiological 
Health have in draft form a plan to evacuate individuals in the plume 
zone to a predesignated assembly area or areas outside the 10-mile 
radius of the Fixed Nuclear Facility where they will be administered 
the potassium iodide. Also, the plan indicates that emergency person-
nel working in the area will be administered the potassium iodide upon 
reporting to the forward Emergency Operating Center in the vicinity of 
the nuclear facility. 
2. Page 16 - Mass Evacuation Plan. 
Emergency Preparedness Division is presently working on an evacuation 
plan for the Robinson Plant in conjuction with the State Highway Patrol. 
Maps are being prepared of the evacuation routes and assembly areas. The 
same procedure is in progress for the Oconee Plant. 
3. Page 96 - Funds for the State Emergency Preparedness Division. 
At the present time, the Emergency Preparedness Division has been 
authorized by the Federal Government (FEMA) to utilize three Nuclear 
Planners that are on 100% Federally funded contracts to assist in the 
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Mr. George L. Schroeder 
Page 2 
April 10, 1980 
Fixed Nuclear Facility planning; however, this authority ceases on 
1 July 80 and these planners must be returned to Crises Relocation 
Planning under the Federal contract with the State. The loss of 
these three planners will decrease our Fixed Nuclear Facility planning 
staff to two people, which will hamper the Fixed Nuclear Facility plan-
ning cycle. 
As you stated in your report, I have reorganized this division to accom-
plish the mission of Fixed Nuclear Facility planning, and we are making 
good progress but, as you can see in paragraph 3 above, the progress, 
will be slowed down without additional help. 
Thanks for the opportunity to review your report and, if I can be of 
further assistance to you, please call on me. 
GRW/bjb 
cc: The Adjutant General 
-141-
Si;;ly~)u, 
~·WISE 
Director 
I 
GLOSSARY 
Actinide - One of a group of radioactive chemical elements from element 89 
(actinium) through element 103 (lawrencium). 
Acute radiation syndrome - A bodily disorder that follows exposure to 
relatively severe doses of ionizing radiation. It is characterized by 
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, blood cell changes, and in later stages 
by loss of hair and hemorrhage. 
Allowable stay-time - Length of time an individual may be exposed to a 
given source of radiation without exceeding a safe dose level. By 
Department of Defense standards an adult (over 21) should not 
receive more than 1. 25 REM per calendar quarter and a maximum of 
5 REM in a calendar year. The maximum acceptable accumulated 
dose is calculated by the equation 5 (N -18) where N = age of the 
individual in years. 
Alpha radiation - The least penetrating of the three common types of 
radiation emitted by radioactive material, being stopped by a sheet 
of paper. It becomes dangerous to animals and man when the alpha-
emitting substance has entered the body by way of the air or water. 
Background radiation - Radiation arising from natural radioactive materials 
always present in the environment, including solar and cosmic radia-
tion and radioactive elements in the upper atmosphere, the ground, 
building materials, and the human body. 
Beta radiation - A form of ionizing radiation consisting of high energy 
electrons that are normally stopped by the skin or a very thin sheet 
of metal. 
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Containment building - The structure housing the nuclear reactor; 
intended to contain radioactive solids, gases, and water that might 
be released from the reactor vessel in an accident. 
Control rod - A rod containing material that absorbs neutrons; used to 
control or halt nuclear fission in a reactor. 
Core - The central part of a nuclear reactor that contains the fuel and 
produces the heat. 
Curie - A unit of the intensity of radicactivity in a material. A curie is 
equal to 37 billion disintegrations each second. (Abbreviated Ci.) 
Dose - A term used to express the amount of radiant energy (i.e. nuclear 
radiation) absorbed in tissue. 
Dosimeter - Small device for measuring the number of roentgens or radia-
tion dosage absorbed in a single exposure to radiation. 
Fission - The splitting apart of a heavy atomic nucleus, into two or more 
parts when a neutron strikes the nucleus. The splitting releases a 
large amount of energy. 
Fission products - Radioactive nuclei and elements formed by the fission 
of heavy elements. 
Fuel damage - The failure of fuel rods and the release of the radioactive 
fission products trapped inside them. Fuel damage can occur without 
a melting of the reactor's uranium. 
Fuel melt - The melting of some of the uranium oxide fuel inside a reactor. 
-143-
Fuel pellet - The basic form in which the uranium is contained. 
Fuel rod - A tube containing fuel pellets for a nuclear reactor. 
Gamma rays - High-energy electromagnetic radiation; a form of ionizing 
radiation I of higher energy than x-rays 1 that penetrates very deep 
into body tissues. Requires shielding by dense material, such as 
lead. 
General emergency - Declared by the utility when an incident at a nuclear 
power plant poses a potentially serious threat of radiation releases 
that could affect the general public. 
Half-life - The time required for half of a given radioactive substance to 
decay. 
Health physics - The practice of protecting humans and their environment 
from the possible hazards of radiation. 
High level waste - Waste which has extremely high radioactivity - as much 
as 10 I 000 curies per gallon. This waste is characterized by high 
levels of penetrating radiation I high heat generation rates I and a 
long toxic life. High level waste is created when reactor spent-fuel 
elements are dissolved in acid to recover unused uranium and plu-
tonium for reuse as nuclear fuel. It is the acid solution remaining 
that is referred to as high level waste. It contains virtually all the 
fission products and small amounts of transuranics - such as 
plutonium - which are not recovered during the reprocessing opera-
tions. It is one of the most hazardous and complex of all radioactive 
wastes to manage. 
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Iodine-131 - A radioactive form of iodine, with a half-life of 8.1 days, 
that can be absorbed by the human thyroid if inhaled or ingested 
and cause non-cancerous or cancerous growths. 
Ionizing radiation - Radiation capable of displacing electrons from atoms; 
the process produces electrically charged atoms or ions. Forms 
include gamma rays, x-rays, and beta particles. 
Isotope - Any of two or more forms of an element having the same or 
very closely related chemical properties and the same atomic number 
but different atomic weights. 
LOCA - Loss of coolant accident, such as a pipe break in the primary 
coolant system of a reactor. 
Man-rem - A unit of population radiation dose. It is the average radiation 
dose in rem multiplied by the number of people in the exposed group. 
(see rem.) 
Melt-down - The melting of fuel in a nuclear reactor after the loss of 
coolant water. If a significant portion of the fuel should melt, the 
molten fuel could melt through the reactor vessel and release large 
quantities of radioactive materials into the containment building. 
Millirem - A term used to measure absorption of radiation by humans. 
The average American is exposed to 100 to 200 millirems of radiation 
per year, including radiation from x-rays to cosmic rays. A normal 
chest x-ray exposes a person to between 20 and 30 millirem. A 
millirem (mr) is 1 one-thousandth of a rem. 
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Neutron - An uncharged particle found in the nucleus of every atom 
heavier than ordinary hydrogen; neutrons sustain the fission chain 
reaction in nuclear reactors. 
Nucleus - The central core of an atom. 
Plutonium (Pu) - A heavy, fissionable, radioactive (alpha emitter) I metallic 
element. Plutonium-239 occurs in nature in trace amounts only. How-
ever I it can be produced as a by-product of the fission reaction in a 
uranium fueled nuclear reactor and can be recovered for future use. 
Potassium iodide - A chemical that readily enters the thyroid gland when 
ingested. If taken in a sufficient quantity prior to exposure to 
radioactive iodine I it can prevent the thyroid from absorbing any 
of the potentially harmful radioactive iodine-131. 
Rad - Standard unit of roentgen absorbed dose, a term that supersedes 
the roentgen as the unit of dosage. A millirad is a thousandth of a 
rad. Doses of a few millirads are now considered safe 1 but there is 
still debate over the threshold between a safe and a hazardous dose. 
Radioactive decay - The spontaneous process by which im unstable radio-
active nucleus releases energy or particles to become stable. 
Radioactivity - The spontaneous decay of an unstable atom. During the 
decay process 1 ionizing radiation is usually given off. 
Radioeffluents - Radioactive emissions released from operating nuclear 
power plants 1 either gaseous or liquid I the allowable amount of 
which is federally regulated. 
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Reactor (nuclear) - A device in which a fission chain reaction can be 
initiated, maintained, and controlled. 
Reactor coolant system - Water that cools the reactor core and carries 
away heat. Also called the primary loop. 
Reactor vessel - The steel tank containing the reactor core; also called 
the pressure vessel. 
Rem - A standard unit for Roentgen Equivalent Man. A measure of the 
quantity of any ionizing radiation with the same biological effective-
ness as one RAD of x-rays. 
Roentgen - A measure of the quantity of x-ray or gamma ray radiation 
in the air. 
Site emergency - Declared by the utility when an incident at a nuclear 
power plant threatens the uncontrolled release of radioactivity into 
the immediate area of the plant. 
Spent-fuel - Potential high level waste which contains all the fission and 
transuranic elements that are found in high level waste and all the 
uranium and plutonium not used during the nuclear reaction. Spent-
fuel is characterized by high levels of penetrating radiation, high 
heat generation rates, and a long toxic life. Spent-fuel has not yet 
been defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as high level 
waste and may not be, because of its potential value as a source of 
fuel if reprocessed. 
Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) - A device to measure nuclear radiation. 
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Transport index - The number placed on a package to designate the 
degree of control to be exercised by the carrier during transporta-
tion. The transport index (TI) to be assigned to a package of 
radioactive materials is determined by either the highest radiation 
dose rate in millirem per hour at three feet from any accessible 
external surface of the package or by dividing the number "50" by 
the number of similar packages which may be transported together 1 
whichever is larger. 
Transuranic contaminated waste - Radioactive waste which contains much 
lower concentrations of radioactivity than high level waste. It is 
generated by plutonium fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing facili-
ties and laboratories using transuranic elements. This waste gener-
ally consists of absorbent tissues 1 clothing, gloves, plastic bags, 
equipment, filters from effluent treatment systems, and fuel hulls 
which remain after fuel reprocessing. 
Type A package - Packaging which is designed in accordance with the 
general packaging requirements which is adequate to prevent the 
loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents and to retain the effi-
ciency of its radiation shielding properties if the package is subject 
to environmental and test conditions prescribed by DOT Regulations. 
Environmental conditions include heat, cold, reduced pressure and 
vibration. Test conditions include water spray I free drop I corner 
drop, penetration and compression. 
Type B package - Packaging which meets the standards for Type A 
packaging and 1 in addition 1 meets the standards for hypothetical 
accident conditions of transportation. 
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Uranium Oxide (U02) - A chemical compound containing uranium and 
oxygen that is used as a fuel in nuclear reactors. 
Zircaloy - A zirconium alloy from which fuel rod cladding is made. 
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